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I. BOULEVERSEMENT ON SUNSET BOULEVARD
Federal communications law has "collapse[d] like the walls
of Jericho."' The Telecommunications Act of 19962 heralds the
dawn of the fateful day on which structural regulation of
America's mass media markets must either stand or fold. Now
that Congress has administered "the devastating blow that
modern technology has threatened to deliver for three decades,"3
courts, communications commissioners, and the communicators
themselves face the daunting task of reconciling and reconsider-
ing the shards of the Communications Act of 1934.'
Numerous tremors preceded the ongoing landslide in federal
communications law. Between 1992 and 1996, no fewer than
four separate laws regulating mass communications quaked or
fell at the feet of hostile judges. An abortive 1992 attempt in the
D.C. Circuit to invalidate the "private cable" exemption5 as
applied to satellite master antenna television systems proved to
1. J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1209,
1209 (1993) (book review).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Telecommunications Act].
3. Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic
Analysis of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEMPHIS L. REv. 1315, 1340 (1995).
4. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1994)).
5. See 47 U.S.C. § 522(7)(B) (1994) (excluding facilities that serve "only
subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership,
control, or management" from the definition of a cable system, thus exempting
such facilities from local franchising obligations), amended by Telecommunica-
tions Act, supra note 2, § 301(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 114 (extending the private cable
exemption to any "facility that serves subscribers without using any public
right-of-way").
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be a false signal of the judicial assault that lay ahead.6 Even as
the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and declared the
private cable exemption "virtually unreviewable,"7 the D.C.
Circuit successfully invalidated three aspects of the Communica-
tions Act8 as applied to direct broadcast satellite services.9 By
1994, pizza-sized satellite dishes carried the news that the
Supreme Court itself had joined the deregulatory frenzy by
casting constitutional doubt on Congress's ability to control cable
operators.' ° Meanwhile, lower federal courts reached a consen-
sus that Congress could not prohibit local telephone companies
from offering video programming services to their subscribers."
For a moment, it appeared as though the Supreme Court itself
might authorize local telephone companies to enter the cable
television business. 2 Technological advances raised the stakes
enormously: unlike coaxial cable used to transmit conventional
cable signals, "switched" telephone wiring can deliver "video
dialtone," or "an enriched version of video common carriage" that
enables interaction between programmers and viewers."
What the federal judiciary launched, Capitol Hill completed.
The 104th Congress has aggressively rolled back many of the
laws that have defined the industrial organization of mass
6. See Beach Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1103, 1105 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (per curiam) (invalidating the private cable exemption as an equal
protection violation), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993).
7. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (1993).
8. See 47 U.S.C. § 335, 544 (1994) (regulating direct broadcast satellite
services, facilities, and equipment).
9. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 8-10 (D.D.C.
1993).
10. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2471-72
(1994) (demanding ftirther empirical proof to support the "must-carry"
obligations imposed under 47 U.S.C. §§ 534(b)(1)(B), (h)(1)(A), 535(a) (1994)).
11. See, e.g., US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir.
1994) (invalidating 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994), which bans any common carrier
from providing video programming to subscribers), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1037
(1996); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 185 (4th
Cir. 1994) (same), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996); see also GTE California, Inc.
v. FCC, 39 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 1994) (Noonan, J., dissenting) ("[Section 533
of Title 47] is an irrational obstruction to the exercise of free speech.").
12. See FCC v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995),
granting cert. to 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996).
13. Telephone Co.-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, §§ 63.54-63.58,
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 300, 306 (1991). See
generally Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control:
Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive
Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1629-32 (1995) (contemplating how the emergence
of interactive media will affect free speech jurisprudence).
1418 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1415
communications since the New Deal. The Telecommunications
Act of 1996 will allow the regional Bell operating companies (the
seven "Baby Bells" spun off from AT&T by the Bell divestiture
decree) 14 to provide long-distance telephone service. 5 Coupled
with the opening of local telephone service to all who would bear
the traffic, including AT&T and the other long-distance gi-
ants, 6 long-distance deregulation would permit AT&T, its
former local divisions, other long-distance companies, and even
cable companies to compete in local and long-distance telephone
markets. Virtually complete deregulation marks a stunning
conclusion not only to the breakup of the Bell System, but also
to over six decades of regulatory legislation. 7
The Communications Act of 1934 is dead; long live the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Before the regulators of
America's wires and airwaves ride into the sunset, however, let
us contemplate the panoramic backdrop of federal mass commu-
nications law's last picture show. If Jericho must fall,'8 let the
sun stand "still ... in the midst of heaven" one more day before
14. See, United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131,223-25 (D.D.C. 1982)
(approving the breakup of the Bell System), affd mem. sub noma., Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp.
1336, 1381 (D.D.C. 1981) (denying AT&T's motion to dismiss the United States'
antitrust suit). See generally MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS LAW §§ 4.4-4.10.3 (1992) (describing the history and terms of the
Bell divestiture decree).
15. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 151, 110 Stat. at 86-92
(adding 47 U.S.C. § 271, which authorizes interexchange telecommunications
by Bell operating companies). See generally Jim Chen, Titanic Telecommunica-
tions, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 535 (1996) (surveying the legal and economic
implications of Bell operating company entry into the interexchange market).
16. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 101(a), 110 Stat. at 61-70
(adding 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-253, which establish ground rules for interconnection
to existing local exchange networks and for the removal of state-law barriers to
entry); Rochester Tel. Corp., 160 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 554, 566-71 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1994) (approving an "Open Market Plan" for the development of
competition within Rochester's local telephone service market); AT&T
Communications of Illinois, Inc., No. 95-0197, 1995 IM. PUC LEXIS 823 (M1l.
Commerce Comm'n. Dec. 6, 1995) (permitting an AT&T subsidiary to provide
facilities-based local exchange telecommunications). See generally Mark
Landler, The Big Boys Come Calling: Rochester Is Courted by AT&T and Time
Warner, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1995, at C1, C6 (describing life after local
telephone deregulation in Rochester).
17. See generally Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An
Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 7 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
18. See Joshua 6:1-27.
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it sets. 9 Although regulating industrial market structure has
always required an enormous leap of faith, 0 six decades of
communications law have injected a heavy dose of agnosticism.
This law, now entering its final phase, has passed by so swiftly
and so tumultuously that it easily can be forgotten. Lest the
ghosts of the checkered regulatory past smother the glories of a
technologically boundless future, let us convert yesterday's
lessons into tomorrow's guideposts.
In this turbulent setting, it is hopeless to prophesy what the
world of mass communications "will do in fact."2' In a "larger
economy[]" where "every right granted by law" is constantly
renegotiated by an "informal parliament of merchants, middle-
men, and consumers,"22 no one knows precisely where consum-
er demand will carry tomorrow's mass media markets. Instead,
after defining the economic phenomenon of mass communica-
tions in Part II of this Article, I will survey the history of
structural regulation of mass communications in the United
States.
Confident that "a page of history is worth a volume of
logic,"2" Part III traces two distinct and contradictory philoso-
phies expressed in federal mass communications law. On one
hand, federal regulators have equated broadcast content with
broadcaster identity and prescribed the regulation of market
structure and industrial organization as the best means for
protecting the public interest in broadcasting. Another jurispru-
dential strain, equally old if not equally enforced, encourages the
courts and the FCC to accord presumptive reliance on competi-
tion to achieve precisely the same regulatory objectives.
Neither the Telecommunications Act of 1996 nor related
19. Joshua 10:13.
20. See Jim Chen & Edward S. Adams, Feudalism Unmodified: Discourses
on Farms and Firms, 45 DRAKE L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) ("[Regulation of
market structure rests on] two core articles of faith. First, structural regulation
of economic activity assumes that certain forms of market structure and
industrial organization are economically or socially pernicious. Second,
regulators believe that these evils can be effectively addressed by legal
restrictions on the formation or structure of individual firms.") (emphasis in
original).
21. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
461 (1897).
22. Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809, 829 (1995).
23. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.); cf
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, JR., THE CoMMoN LAw 1 (1902) ("The life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience.").
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judicial controversies over communications policy will resolve
this decades-long debate. If history teaches anything, however,
it is the hard lesson that regulators ignore the economics of a
technologically driven industry at their peril. Part IV of this
article accordingly outlines certain antitrust-inspired regulatory
principles for designing tomorrow's mass media markets.
Regulators should reconcile communications law with latent
economic principles that have remained underenforced in the
FCC's conventional interpretation of the "public interest."24
The emergence of gargantuan media conglomerates, each large
enough to control vast amounts of programming but none
powerful enough to conquer the entire industry, requires a
comprehensive rethinking of mass communications and its
regulation. The imminent collapse of the mass communications
cathedral as we know it promises to transform certain notions
central to the regulatory project-scarcity, networks, and the
very idea of competition itself. As it was on the day when
Jericho fell, let the trumpets blare.25
H. TALKING ALL AT ONCE
A. UNSTABLE AT ANY SPEED
26
What is this phenomenon called mass communications? By
air, by wire, or by newsrack,27 modes of mass communication
enable one speaker to reach as broad an audience as technology
and consumer interest permit. "Broadcasting" in its pre-
industrial sense defines every would-be mass communicator;
24. Cf Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1978)
(discussing certain valid but "underenforced" constitutional norms).
25. Cf Joshua 6:20 ("So the people shouted when the priests blew with the
trumpets: and it came to pass, when the people heard the sound of the trumpet,
and the people shouted with a great shout, that the wall fell down flat .. ").
26. Cf RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED, at ix (1965) ("A great problem
of contemporary life is how to control the power of economic interests which
ignore the harmful effects of their applied science and technology.").
27. Cf City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1507
(1993) (striking down a city's exclusion of "commercial publications [from] free-
standing newsracks located on public property"); City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988) (striking down an ordinance
"giving [a city's] mayor unfettered discretion to deny a permit application" for
the placement of newsracks); DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG ET AL., REGULATION OF THE
ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA: LAW AND POLICY FOR RADIO, TELEVISION, CABLE AND
THE NEW VIDEO TECHNOLOGIES, at xlvi-xlvii (2d ed. 1991) (analogizing television
and cable regulation to newsrack regulation).
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even those who resort to sound trucks for want of less "loud and
raucous" means of speech28 seek to scatter their ideas in the
way a cotton farmer strews seed on plowed and fertile land.29
Though it will always be "easier for the rich to speak than it is
for the poor,"3" the sudden emergence of broadcasting technolo-
gies is opening unbelievably broad avenues for new communica-
tion, new speech, new ideas.
Sweeping technological change has not substantially
changed the underlying mechanics and economics of mass
communications. Oddly enough, in an age when the Internet
and the facsimile machine have relegated many traditional forms
of communication to the derogatory status of "snail mail,"3' the
definition of mass communications may still be found in
Congress's seemingly anachronistic power "[t]o establish Post
Offices and Post Roads." 2 Moreover, examining a communica-
tions system at terrestrial speeds may help us understand how
traffic crosses an "information superhighway"" on which
Einstein's law of relativity sets the speed limit. 4 In this
respect, regulators and private players in modern mass media
markets agree. The novel communications medium of "video
dialtone" follows a "Post Office" model of "open entry," under
which a unified delivery service merely channels a variety of
entertainment and information services into households and
leaves the services' success or failure to be determined by
consumer receptiveness.
28. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting)
("There are many people who have ideas that they wish to disseminate but who
do not have enough money to own or control publishing plants, newspapers,
radios, moving picture studios, or chains of show places."); cf City of Ladue v.
Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1994) ("Especially for persons of modest means or
limited mobility, a yard or window sign may have no practical substitute.").
29. See JAMES AGEE & WALKER EvANS, LET Us Now PRAISE FAMOUS MEN
329-30 (2d ed. 1960).
30. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805,
1806 (1995).
31. Watch Sandra Bullock in THE NET (Columbia Pictures 1995).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
33. Then-Senator Al Gore first used this term to describe the information
revolution. Al Gore, Networking the Future: We Need a National "Superhigh-
way"for Computer Information, WASH. POST, July 15, 1990, at B3.
34. Cf Berman & Weitzner, supra note 13, at 1635-36 (noting how
Benjamin Rush and James Madison viewed the post office, the state-of-the-art
communications system as essential to participatory democracy).
35. See In re Telephone Co.-Cable Television Cross Ownership Rules, 7
F.C.C.R. 5781, 5807-08 (1992), terminated by, Telecommunications Act, supra
note 2, § 302(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 124.
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Just as privately owned common carriers must charge "just
and reasonable" rates for interstate or foreign communication
services,36 the United States Postal Service37 is obligated to
charge "reasonable and equitable rates of postage."" National
Association of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal
Service," a 1983 Supreme Court controversy over the Postal
Rate Commission's methodology for reviewing Postal Service
rates, illuminates the intricate relationship between monopoly
and competition in communications. Like the Court, we can
afford to simplify the classes of mail: first class for letters,
second class for newspapers and magazines, third class for bulk
mail, fourth class for parcels, and the "Express Mail" overnight
service.4 ° When setting rates, the Rate Commission must
require "each class of mail or type of mail service [to] bear the
direct and indirect postal costs attributable to that class or type
plus that portion of all other costs ... reasonably assignable to
such class or type."4'
Lower federal courts had split over the amount of discretion
that the Rate Commission enjoyed in "assigning" as opposed to
"attributing" costs. In 1981, the Second Circuit held that the
difference between these two verbs enabled the Rate Commission
to "assign" costs freely as long as it "attributed" short-run
variable costs to each class.42 By contrast, an earlier D.C.
Circuit decision required the Rate Commission to "attribute" and
"assign" two independent tiers of costs before distributing any
remaining "residual costs" in a discretionary fashion.4" The
Supreme Court adopted the Second Circuit's more flexible two-
tiered scheme, permitting the Rate Commission "the use of any
36. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
37. See 39 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1994) (outlining the organization of the U.S.
Postal Service).
38. Id. § 3621. For exemplary cases describing the postal variant of cost-of-
service ratemaking, see Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States, 2 F.3d 408
(D.C. Cir. 1993); United Parcel Serv. v. United States Postal Serv., 604 F.2d
1370 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
39. 462 U.S. 810 (1983).
40. Cf id. at 813 n.2 (organizing postal services according to "four broad
classes of mail").
41. 39 U.S.C. § 3622(b)(3) (1994).
42. Newsweek, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 663 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir.
1981), affd and remanded sub nom. National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers
v. United States Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810 (1983).
43. National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal
Serv., 569 F.2d 570, 586-87 & n.59, 592-93 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated on other
grounds, 434 U.S. 884 (1977).
1422
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method that reliably identifies causal relationships" between
postal rates and costs of service.4
Alexander the Great unraveled the Gordian knot by slicing
it. We likewise can penetrate this regulatory tangle by acknowl-
edging the federal postal monopoly. Private competitors led by
United Parcel Service had defended the D.C. Circuit's "extended
use of cost-of-service principles" as a "necessary" tool for
"avoid[ing] subsidization of those classes of mail for which the
Postal Service has competition, such as parcel post, by other
classes of mail for which the Postal Service enjoys a statutory
monopoly, such as first class."4" Thanks to rents collected
under its monopoly over first-class mail, the Postal Service does
enjoy a small war chest. In classic fashion, the private competi-
tors argued that the Postal Service would cross-subsidize
unregulated lines of business, especially parcel and premium
services. (This is precisely the instinct that justified line-of-
business restrictions in the Bell divestiture decree.)46
But the Postal Service makes a poor competitor. The Postal
Service has never been able to leverage its first-class monopoly
into cross-subsidies for other profit-making services. "Federal
Express and other competitors" have made a fortune at the
Postal Service's expense,47 and the overnight mail delivery
market all but epitomizes "healthy competition in a declining
unit cost industry."4" Rather, the Postal Service's first-class
war chest finances second-class mail, the delivery system of
choice for newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals with
substantial "educational, cultural, scientific, and informational
value."49 The Postal Rate Commission's "value-of-service" pricing
scheme 0 represented "a convenient method of subsidizing" a
44. Greeting Card Publishers, 462 U.S. at 833-34.
45. Id. at 829.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,121, at 66,267-70, 66,282-83 (D.D.C. July 26, 1984).
47. Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An
Economic Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335,
1356 (1986).
48. Id. at 1355.
49. 39 U.S.C. § 3622(b)(8) (1994); cf Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 159 n.10 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring
in judgment) (arguing that "the existence of newspapers," especially the most
vulnerable "10,000 magazines and small newspapers.., is dependent upon...
second-class postage rates").
50. See generally Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. ICC, 985 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (reviewing the ICC's decision to use a "revenue over variable cost" method
1423
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favored form of communication.5 There was and is no need to
tap the federal fisc for a tax-financed subsidy. Instead, internal
cross-subsidization transfers the political struggle over postal
rates out of the House Ways and Means Committee and into the
Postal Rate Commission.
5 2
Despite its fabled inefficiency, the Postal Service exhibits the
essential characteristics of a regulated mass communications
system. Like telephony (literally, "far speaking")53 or airline
service, postal service is at its core a system for connecting any
two points. In the aggregate, however, these connections form
a network, an entity far more impressive than its individual
components.54 The postal network enables the bulk-mailer to
reach millions of households at once.
In the communications context, the idea of a network serves
as a healthy reminder that a single medium can serve multiple
purposes simultaneously. The same Postal Service that delivers
heart-to-heart billets-doux also drops tons of junk mail on
unsuspecting recipients. A fiber optic network connecting
millions of households is no less a broadcast medium than a
snippet of the electromagnetic spectrum. Thus the local
telephone company becomes an "integral component in an
indivisible dissemination system,55 merely one of many nodes
in an all-embracing 'network of networks."'55
instead of its traditional "constrained market methodology" for setting rates in
markets dominated by a single rail carrier); William J. Baumol & David F.
Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM. ECON. REV.
265, 280 (1970) ("[Uinless marginal cost pricing happens to provide returns
sufficient to meet the [legally mandated] revenue requirement, a quasi-optimal
allocation calls for systematic deviations of prices from marginal costs
throughout the economy") (emphasis in original); Frank Ramsey, A Contribution
to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927).
51. Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SC. 22, 26 (1971).
52. See Edmund L. Andrews, A Publishers' Slugfest Over Postal Rates, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 13, 1995, at C1 ("The cliche around here is that second-class mail
accounts for about 5 percent of revenues, 10 percent of volume, and about 90
percent of the headaches").
53. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 14, § 1.2.1, at 5 (describing the Greek
etymology of telephony).
54. For two recent articles making this point, see generally Michael L. Katz
& Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 93 (1994); Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network
Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 133 (1994).
55. General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 402 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 888 (1969).
56. Sidak, supra note 1, at 1210.
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Regulation adds a crucial element to the network as a
conceptual device. Access to a restricted communications
network equals the right to broadcast, and the use of that right
yields some measure of diversity. In the name of diversity,
regulators may demand that certain types of speech, such as
locally originated or minority-oriented programming, be provided
as a condition of licensing. As we shall see, the FCC and the
courts have interpreted the Communication Act's "public
convenience, interest, or necessity" standard5 7 by equating
diversity with the identity of individual broadcasters. This
enterprise died of a single, tragic flaw: the failure to heed the
laws of economics.
B. THE DEEP STRUCTURE OF MASS MEDIA MARKETS
1. An Epic Tale
Like ancient Gaul,5 8 the natural gas industry,59 and virtu-
ally every other line of business in an age of mass production
and mass consumption, 0 mass communications consists of
three distinct segments: production, wholesale transmission, and
retail distribution to end consumers. At first glance, program
production hardly seems amenable to command-and-control
regulation, regardless of whether producers "cultivate" programs
as though they were farm commodities6' or whether they
engage in the relatively haphazard "gathering" of talent
wherever they find it.62 Vicious competition dominates this
57. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994).
58. See C. JULIUS CAESAR, COMIdENTARII CUM A. HiRTI ALIORUMQUE
SUPPLEMENTIS REcOGNOviT BERNARDUs DINTER 1 (1890)("Gallia est omnis
divisa en partes tres.") (Gaul is wholly divided in three parts).
59. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 691 (1954)
(Clark, J., dissenting) ('The natural gas industry, like ancient Gaul, is divided
into three parts. These parts are production and gathering, interstate
transmission by pipeline, and distribution to consumers by local distribution
companies.").
60. Cf Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347,
1352 (5th Cir. 1976) (describing the chrysanthemum industry as one comprising
three tiers: breeders, self-propagators, and retail florists), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1094 (1977).
61. Cf Capper-Volstead Act § 1, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1994) (authorizing
"[plersons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers" to
organize capital-stock and nonstock cooperatives with a modest degree of
immunity from the federal antitrust laws).
62. Cf 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1994) (preserving state authority to regulate the
interstate transportation, "local distribution," and "production or gathering" of
1425
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sector. Like other systems of public utility regulation, federal
communications law prescribes regulatory supervision of
transmitters and distributors. A study of the entire market
suggests why.
The production sector consists of actors generating informa-
tion and creating messages. Closer examination discloses a
sharp divide within this sector. One subsector constantly
generates information it wishes to sell as intrinsically valuable.
In other words, if a speaker could overcome prohibitive transac-
tion costs and connect to potential listener-buyers, he or she
could sell the information for its own sake. Indeed, under some
circumstances, a speaker may find it possible to make direct
sales. A distinct subsector communicates in a vastly different
fashion. By and large, the messages generated here are not
marketable in themselves; they convey information leading to
future commercial transactions. This subsector likewise benefits
from the broadest possible dissemination of its information, since
every listener is a potential customer.
These two subsectors are, of course, the news/sports/
entertainment and the advertising segments of the communica-
tions industry. Conveniently, their spheres of activity corre-
spond to the constitutional divide between "core" and "commer-
cial" speech." These subsectors rely heavily on each other.
Entertainers offer goods in high demand but often cannot
finance the effective transmission and distribution of their
messages. Advertisers have plenty of money to communicate
their messages, but no willing audience. Under the traditional
"three-cornered" model of broadcasting, "[b]roadcasters lure
audiences with programs and sell the audiences to advertisers,
who in turn show advertisements to the audiences."64 Audienc-
es themselves do not directly pay for programming."
Consider the phenomenon of mass communications through
one sequence of anecdotes on the rise of the Indigo Girls.
Though now a folk duo of some repute, Amy Ray and Emily
Saliers were once numbered among an indistinct multitude of
struggling start-up musicians. Like most other such performers,
natural gas).
63. See generally Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980).
64. Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64
S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 305 (1991).
65. Id.
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they solicited and accepted "contributions" during informal
performances. Soon they began to sell gigs to Greek-letter
organizations in Atlanta and Athens, Georgia. More lucrative
engagements awaited them at establishments that generate
more revenue from liquor sales than from admission fees.
66
Eventually a big studio signed the Indigo Girls, and the duo
went on to a streak of successful recordings and performances.
But this "Epic" story is missing one element. The market
for musicians is chronically overcrowded. The likelihood that
any folk duo, however talented, would go national was remark-
ably slim. In their infancy, the Indigo Girls, like any other
group, lived and died by exposure. Many vendors simultaneous-
ly wanted to reach the audience attracted by the Indigo Girls'
music. What the entertainers and the advertisers needed was
a mutually beneficial arrangement and for reaching as many
potential listener-buyers as possible.
Quite obviously, the critical facility is broadcasting, primari-
ly radio but possibly even broadcast or cable television. (This
story takes place, after all, during the early days of MTV.) A
quick examination of radio station operation exposes another
problem, however. There is an enormous volume and variety of
information being produced. Such are the vicissitudes of
competition.6" A programming director can connect with some
ease to a few advertisers, but not to a substantial number of
entertainers. Hence the rise of a national transmission sector,
made up of firms that specialize in garnering entertainment and
selling them in marketable bundles to local broadcasters and
cable operators. Again the structure of the law reflects
subspecialties within the sector: whereas the copyright notion of
a phonorecord defines the stock-in-trade of today's music
publishers and yesterday's radio networks, the copyright notion
of audiovisual works defines the work of today's cable program-
mers and broadcast television networks.6" Though the multiple
channels for transmitting mass media are less tangible than the
66. Cf INDIGO GIRLS, Closer to Fine, on INDIGO GIRLS (Epic 1989) ("I
stopped by the bar at 3 a.m. / To seek solace in a bottle or possibly a friend").
But of GIN BLOSSOMS, Lost Horizons, on NEW MISERABLE EXPERIENCE (A&M
Records, Inc. 1992) ("Drink enough of anything to make this world look new
again ... and when the sin smiles how could it be wrong").
67. See generally Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another
Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969).
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining, inter alia, "audiovisual works" and
"Phonorecords").
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natural gas pipelines that kept the old Federal Power Commis-
sion busy, both industries are sprawling, "unitary enterprises"
that integrate the delivery of valuable goods from initial
production to ultimate consumption.69
The final sector, distribution, is the traditional regulatory
focus of the FCC. So far we have encountered no physical
restraints on entry and exit. To be sure, the transmission
industry exhibits some of the characteristics of a natural
monopoly: a large initial capital investment, increasing returns
on scale, and constantly declining marginal costs of production
over the relevant range of output.70  But the transmission
sector during the pre-electronic era (i.e., book and newspaper
publishers) faced similar barriers to perfect competition.
Traditional mass communications law focused on the distribution
sector on the assumption that local broadcasting acted as a
bottleneck. The electromagnetic spectrum is limited; manipula-
tion of signal strength allows a regulator to adjust but not
expand the atmosphere's capacity for wirelessly transmitted
messages. The likeliest channel by which individual consumers
receive information is the local distribution facility. Hence the
fixation with broadcast licensing and broadcaster identity.
2. The Terms and Conditions of Competition
Three factors loom large in the project of describing or
prescribing competition in mass communications. The first is
the basis by which firms at various levels of the industry
compete. A dominant or monopolistic firm does not necessarily
price-gouge or suppress output.71 "Free" broadcasts cannot and
do not compete on the basis of price. Consumers do not pay in
dollars, but rather in forgone uses of time spent in front of the
tube. Rather, inadequate competition in the transmission and
69. FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 488 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); accord Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of
Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 515 (1989) (noting that the production, transportation, and
sale of gas operate as one enterprise).
70. See generally Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation,
21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969).
71. To be sure, exclusive cable franchises charge all that the traffic will
bear, and state-owned television networks in Europe restrict the broadcast day
to encourage their citizens to pursue alternative pastimes and perhaps even to
retard the rate of American cultural encroachment. By contrast, the traditional
"three-cornered" model of advertiser-financed broadcast television, see supra text
accompanying notes 63-65, contemplates neither a system of direct viewer
finance nor a significant public role in programming.
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distribution sector would retard product differentiation and
responsiveness to the broadcast audience. The presence of
healthy competition thus expresses itself through diversity in
program content and viewpoint.72 Content, arguably the single
most important factor in traditional First Amendment analysis,
is also the basis by which mass communicators compete.73
Although the mind-numbing monotony that rules in the absence
of diversity hardly needs definition, Ellen Burstyn's cinematic
admonition is worth noting: "Just remember, Beautiful: every-
thing gets old if you do it often enough." 4
Like any other quantitative or qualitative characteristic of
a marketed good, programming diversity depends on a mixture
of producer-specific and consumer-specific factors. Historically,
most FCC policies designed to affect program content and
viewpoint have focused on local broadcasters. Most observers
agree that regulation has made some difference, even if it has
not genuinely succeeded. Deregulation would result in a vastly
different mix of programs."
A focus on local broadcasting-the distribution sector in
mass communication-arguably gives short shrift to a second,
crucial factor affecting competition. That factor is vertical
integration. Existing or potential competition can alter the
relationship between the vertically tiered sectors of the industry.
A substantial body of FCC policy assumes that encouraging local
distribution firms to produce programs can offset the risk that
a structurally competitive production sector might be dominated
or even wholly absorbed by more powerful firms. Vigorous
competition exposes the production sector to domination by a
transmission sector that consists of a few firms engaged in
oligopolistic, nonprice competition.
Overwhelming market dominance in the transmission of
information overshadows the risk of potential distributional
72. Cf, FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 585 (1981) (defining
diversity according to a radio station's "entertainment format"); Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing
children's programming as a vulnerable specialty market).
73. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the
New Mass Media, and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141,
164 (1995).
74. Watch THE LAST PICTURE SHOW, (Last Picture Show Productions, Inc.,
1971).
75. See generally Matthew L. Spitzer, Controlling the Content of Print and
Broadcast, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1349, 1382-84 (1985).
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monopolies. The phenomenon resembles the relationship
between the market power conferred by a patent and the market
power that triggers searching antitrust scrutiny.6 A legal
system animated by its "instinctive aversion" to even the
"limited patent monopoly" inherent in rights for inventors"
must nevertheless concede that the availability of substitutes
curbs the market power of patented products."5 Likewise, local
broadcasting looks far less like a monopoly when viewed in light
of the vastly greater market power of nationwide radio and
television networks. Although each local broadcaster enjoys
geographic market power by virtue of the electromagnetic
spectrum's physical limits, the many firms populating the
distribution sector are puny vis-&-vis the mere handful of large
networks. Under this scenario, encouraging local programming
not only serves specific local constituencies but also promises to
defend local broadcasters against networks that would otherwise
leverage their power over transmission into comprehensive
market domination. What John Kenneth Galbraith has termed
"countervailing power" befits this strategy;79 even Chicago
School economists s° concede that the occasional "bilateral
monopoly" may have "a potentially beneficial impact on the
eventual consumer."8'
Finally, all three sectors have tended toward increasing
competition. If the information superhighway has broadened far
beyond the alley by which a few networks supplied their local
76. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396
(1947) (noting that patents do not automatically provide immunity from
antitrust); cf Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 9 (1958)
(extending antitrust scrutiny to cases in which a firm attempts to leverage its
market power in an unpatented product to another product market).
77. E.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1965); see also Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(describing the "monopoly privileges" in patents and copyrights as "limited
grant[s]" designed "to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by
the provision of a special [and temporally finite] reward").
78. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8
RES. L. & ECON. 31 (1986) (arguing that the property rights conferred by
patents are restrained by competitive market pressures).
79. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT
OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 128-31 (1952).
80. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, ECONOMIC THEORY 94-95 (1971); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 191-92 (1976); GEORGE STIGLER, THE THEORY OF
PRICE 207-08 (3d ed. 1966).
81. National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816,842 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting).
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affiliates, does it make much regulatory sense to remain
obsessed about the original two lanes? True, the other lanes
may be the mass communications equivalent of toll roads-cable
and other subscription services charge access fees-but those
lanes travel at higher speeds and lead to a greater variety of
destinations. They combine the speed of an express train with
the convenience of a local run. Intermodal competition in
program production and delivery therefore promises consumers
a superior information package. It also threatens to render
obsolete all economic assumptions underlying the structural
regulation of mass communications.
III. REVISITING MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW, THIS
TIME WITH ATTITUDE
A. WE WANT THE AIRWAVES
8 2
Federal communications law, so the world believes, is the
story of an expert federal agency, charged with dividing scarce
electromagnetic spectrum among applicants according to the
"public interest." Hoping to forestall a dictatorial empire of the
air, the regulators of the Republic set out to "carve [the air-
waves] as a dish fit for the gods," without "hew[ing]" the
broadcast spectrum "as a carcass fit for hounds.""3 In enacting
the Radio Act of 19274 and the Communications Act of
1934,5 "Congress moved under the spur of a widespread fear
that in the absence of governmental control the public interest
might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the
broadcasting field."86
During the early twentieth century, fear of monopoly was
well-grounded. Primeval mass communicators repeatedly tried
to conquer an entire entertainment or information industry.
82. Hear THE RAMONES, We Want the Airwaves, on PLEASANT DREAMS
(Warner Bros. 1981).
83. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR, act 2, sc. 1,
11. 173-74 (Riverside ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1974) (1599).
84. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, amended by, 46 Stat. 844 (1930); see also
Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266,274-
87 (1933) (discussing the Radio Commission's authority); Federal Radio Comm'n
v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1930) (discussing the purpose of the
Act).
85. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1994)).
86. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940); accord,
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).
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During World War I, the inventors of the earliest forms of movie
technology tried to leverage their control over cameras, projec-
tors, and film into comprehensive command of motion picture
production, distribution, and exhibition."7 Federal action on
two fronts finally ended the threat. The Justice Department
successfully broke up a multinational cartel that not only set the
rental rates on films but also controlled virtually all film
distribution in the United States.8  Meanwhile, the Supreme
Court repelled the same cartels effort to condition the sale of
patented projectors on an agreement to show only movies
produced under the cartel's expired patents.89
Throughout the 1930s and beyond, Hollywood studios90 and
even distributors of motion picture advertising9 used a variety
of conspiracies and ham-fisted contracts to control retail film
exhibition. By mid-century, print journalism had likewise
become dominated by the few massive news organizations
capable of amassing the capital needed to collect and deliver all
the news that's fit to print.92 "Payola," the practice of bribing
87. See generally MICHAEL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE
INDUSTRY 16-21 (1960).
88. See United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 F. 800, 811-12
(E.D. Pa. 1915).
89. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502, 513 (1917); cf United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 & n.4 (1962)
(invalidating a movie studio's effort to force theaters into "block-booking" as a
condition upon access to the studio's copyrighted films); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948) (same). These practices
have given rise to the modem doctrine of "copyright misuse." See, e.g.,
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972-73 (4th Cir. 1990); Note,
Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and
First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1290-1307 (1991).
90. See, e.g., Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346
U.S. 537, 538 (1954) ("alleging that ... motion picture producers and
distributors had ... conspir[ed] to restrict 'irst-run' pictures to downtown
Baltimore theatres, thus confining... suburban theatre[s] to subsequent runs");
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 214, 232 (1939) (finding
that distributors controlling "about 75 percent of all first-class feature films
exhibited in the United States" had conspired to impose downstream restric-
tions on exhibitors); United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44, 54-
55 (1930) (invalidating terms by which film distributors would deal with
exhibitors); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 41-
42 (1930) (same).
91. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 393
(1953).
92. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 13 n.10 (1945) ("It is
practically impossible for any one newspaper alone to establish or maintain the
organization requisite for collecting all of the news of the world.").
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disk jockeys to play certain songs, has been a classic tool for
advancing the pecuniary interests of a highly concentrated music
industry throughout the twentieth century9 3 and remains a
substantial legal problem today.94 In radio and broadcast
television, comprehensive control of production, transmission,
and distribution by a fully integrated network seemed equally
inevitable.
These developments suggested that the real potential for
monopoly lay in mass communications' transmission sector
rather than the distribution sector. If so, Congress should have
directly regulated the networks and movie studios in the same
fashion as interstate electric utilities and natural gas pipelines.
Through legislation contemporaneous with the Communications
Act of 1934, Congress imposed traditional public utility regula-
tion on the interstate transmission of electricity95 and inter-
state transportation of natural gas.96 No less than mass
communications, these industries had become marked by
"growing scarcity" and by "a highly concentrated control of the
producers' market and of... consumers' supplies."9
But the Communications Act followed a different path.
Congress expressly excluded radio broadcasters from the Act's
definition of a "common carrier"98 and instead ordered the FCC
to issue broadcast licenses "as public convenience, interest, or
necessity requires,"" with neither the power to set rates0 °
93. See generally R.H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting,
22 J.L. & ECON. 269 (1979); J. Gregory Sidak & David E. Kronemyer, The "New
Payola" and the American Record Industry: Transactions Costs and Precaution-
ary Ignorance in Contracts for Illicit Services, 10 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POLY 521
(1987).
94. See 47 U.S.C. § 508 (1994) (requiring the disclosure of payments to
individuals connected with broadcasts); United States v. Goodman, 945 F.2d
125, 128-29 (6th Cir. 1991); Stuart Talley, Performance Rights in Sound
Recordings: Is There Justification in the Age of Digital Broadcasting?, 28
BEVERLY HILLS B.A. J. 79, 84-85 (1994). But cf Coase, supra note 93, at 318-19
(suggesting that payola may benefit consumers).
95. Federal Power Act, Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 687, §§ 201-213, 49 Stat.
847-54 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824m (1994)).
96. Natural Gas Act, Act of June 21, 1938, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1994)).
97. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 637 (1944) (separate
opinion of Jackson, J.).
98. See Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 3(h), 48 Stat. 1064, 1066 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 153(h)(1994)) ("[A] person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not
... be deemed a common carrier.").
99. Id. § 303, 48 Stat. at 1082 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303
(1994)).
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nor the power to censor.' The die might have been cast well
before the New Deal. Federal intervention in "the chaotic
scramble for domestic air space" had begun with the Radio Act
of 1912.102 That effort failed, however, because the Secretary
of Commerce and Labor had no power to prevent the use of
unassigned frequencies, to restrict transmitting power and
broadcasting schedules, or to deny a license that would interfere
with existing stations.' ° In light of this legislative failure, the
1927 and 1934 Acts focused the government's attention on the
licensing of local broadcasters.
The distributional "monopoly" that apparently inspired the
Communications Act of 1934 and its predecessor statutes soon
proved to be a mirage. By 1943, the FCC and the Supreme
Court recognized that a far greater source of potentially
distorting market power lay in the transmission sector, in the
possibility that nationwide networks would dominate program-
ming from the top down.1 4 The original conception of mass
communications law nevertheless remained, and to this day
many observers assume that scarce frequencies would be
wastefully allocated in the absence of a centralized scheme for
rationalizing the initial allocation of broadcasting rights.
05
At an early stage in the development of broadcast licensing
law, the Supreme Court granted rival applicants the right to
100. Cf id. § 201(b), 48 Stat. at 1070 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (1994)) (authorizing the FCC to set "just and reasonable" rates for "[all
charges ... in connection with [interstate or foreign] communication service"
provided by common carriers by wire or radio).
101. See id. § 326, 48 Stat. at 1091 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 326
(1994)) (denying the power of censorship to the Commission).
102. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1953); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
103. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. Ill.
1926); Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1006 (D.C. Ct. App. 1923).
104. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,216-17 (1943).
105. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2457
(1994) (declining to abandon "the scarcity rationale" underlying cases such as
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)); William N. Van
Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29
S.C. L. REV. 539, 562 (1978) (arguing that allocating rights to broadcast in an
inherently scarce electromagnetic spectrum would winnow "the field of
otherwise eligible applicants strictly according to their ability to pay" and would
eliminate "those who lack dollars to put in an effective bid"); cf CASS R.
SuNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 57-58 (1993)
(arguing more generally that the failure to regulate speech, especially in
contexts marked by scarcity, favors the rich and skews an already imperfect
marketplace of ideas in favor of the preferences of the privileged).
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comparative licensing proceedings. 16 The so-called Ashbacker
right to comparative licensing is premised on the idea that
awarding any license necessarily precludes the use of the same
frequency in the same area by another broadcaster.' The
mutual exclusivity of applications to broadcast on one frequency
reinforces the perception of scarcity, in stark contrast with
regulatory settings where the granting of a license may injure a
competitor but does not perforce exclude it from the market-
place.'08 But comparative licensing of broadcast rights could
not of its own force tame the sprawling mass communications
industry. Although the Court prescribed the comparative
hearing as the method for resolving exclusive applications, it did
not define the substantive standards by which the FCC was to
compare applicants. In a field crowded with fit, willing, and able
applicants,' 9 the FCC wove a complex web of factors for
resolving licensing disputes.
The fixation on comparative hearings obscured the possibili-
ty of alternative means for distributing broadcasting
entitlements. The Commission's flirtation with lotteries as a
method for allocating new AM, FM, and television frequencies
suggested the feasibility of auctions in the 1980s," ° and Con-
106. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945). But cf
Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285
(1933) (entitling an applicant who met the requirements of the Radio Act of
1927 to be licensed even if the Federal Radio Commission had neither heard nor
considered later applications).
107. See Ashbacker, 326 U.S. at 330, 332-33; cf FCC v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 319 U.S. 239, 243-44, 247 (1943) (allowing an incumbent licensee to
intervene in another licensee's application to increase transmission power and
expand hours of operation if such changes would cause "electrical interference").
108. See, e.g., Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Rowe, 284 F.2d 274,279 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) (sustaining a savings and loan charter granted without a comparative
hearing, on the reasoning that the charter did not bar the competitors from the
home lending business); cf Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292, 294-
97 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (using similar reasoning in railroad regulation).
109. Cf, 49 U.S.C. § 10,922(a)(1)-(2) (1994) (requiring the late Interstate
Commerce Commission to find that a would-be motor carrier is "fit, willing, and
able properly to perform the service proposed").
110. See Selection from Among Competing Applicants for New AM, FM, &
Television Stations by Lottery, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,416, 11,416 (FCC Mar. 20, 1989);
Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection from Among
Competing Applicants for New AM, FM, & Television Stations by Random
Selection (Lottery), 4 F.C.C.R. 2256 (1989); Amendment of the Commission's
Rules to Allow the Selection from Among Competing Applicants for New AM,
FM, & Television Stations by Random Selection (Lottery), 5 F.C.C.R. 4002
(1990).
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gress in 1993 gave the FCC the long-awaited authority to
conduct competitive bidding."' The recent auction of spectrum
space for narrowband and broadband personal communication
services and interactive video and data services portends greater
use of market-oriented techniques." 2 As far back as 1959,
Ronald H. Coase weighed the FCC's public interest method of
allocating spectrum and found it wanting. Coase argued that an
open market could resolve potential conflicts over electromagnet-
ic interference."' Harvey Levin contemporaneously proposed
that the FCC auction all new licenses and collect annual
royalties in order to finance noncommercial stations, minority
programming, and other underserved broadcasting interests."4
Thomas Hazlett offers an even more explicitly market-
oriented perspective. He asserts that FCC regulation in the
"public interest" preserved the original broadcasters' "priority-in-
use" system of allocating rights at the expense of a more rational
auction."5  This view regards the earliest broadcasters as
"spectrum squatters" who parlayed their superior political
prowess into a legal scheme that treated them as homestead-
ers." ' Regardless of this dispute's historical significance, its
prescriptive implications remain the same: switch to a market-
based system of broadcast rights forthwith and allow ordinary
forces of entry and exit to allocate scarce spectrum."7
111. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002,
107 Stat. 312, 387 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (1994)).
112. See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 322 of the Communications
Act-Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,042 (May 31,
1994) (proposed rule); Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications
Act-Competitive Bidding, 59 Fed. Reg. 44,272 (Aug. 26, 1994) (final rule to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. § 1.2101-1.2111); see also New Personal Communications
Services: Pioneer's Preference Review, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,521 (Aug. 18, 1994)
(requiring recipients of "pioneer's preferences" for new communications services
or technology to pay for licenses awarded without competition from mutually
exclusive applications).
113. See R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. &
EcON. 1, 14-31 (1959).
114. See Harvey J. Levin, Regulatory Efficiency, Reform and the FCC, 50
GEO. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1961).
115. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast
Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 171-72 (1990).
116. Cf MARION CLAWSON, UNCLE SAM'S ACRES 69-70 (1951) (describing how
"sooners" snatched the best lands before the 1889 "Oklahoma Opening" of the
former Indian Territory to white settlement).
117. For a recent discussion of the relative merits of comparative hearings,
lotteries, and auctions, see Licensing Policies & Procedures, Satellite Communi-
cations, 59 Fed. Reg. 53,294, 53,303-04 (Oct. 21, 1994). Unlike auctions,
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Competition, contrary to widespread belief, is entirely
consistent with the regulatory enterprise. Under well-estab-
lished regulatory principles, a legal commitment to licensing in
the public interest does not require an agency to ignore reduced
prices or other manifestations of superior performance. Indeed,
"[t]he ability of one mode of [service] to operate with a rate lower
than competing types of [service] is precisely the sort of 'inherent
advantage' that must be examined under a mandate to regulate
in the public interest.""' Such solicitude for lower price
applies directly to traditional telecommunications settings such
as local access and transport or interexchange carriage, and
inevitably will affect broadcast media as technological changes
continue to blur the boundary between telephony and mass
communications.
The FCC's institutional culture, however, historically has
favored incumbent protection over competition. Although the
Communications Act itself "contains no express command"
directing the FCC to "consider the effect of competition," the
Commission has loosely cobbled its competition policy from "the
purpose of the Act and the specific provisions intended to
effectuate that purpose.""9 The classic statement of the FCC's
responsibility to consider factors besides competition, especially
backward-looking concerns over previous licensees' sunk
investments, comes from a 1953 case involving radio-telegraph
"lotteries attract speculators-individuals who have no relevant experience and
no serious intention to construct and operate" a mass communications network.
Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 of the Commission's Rules with Regard to Filing
Procedures in the Multipoint Distribution Serv. and in the Instructional
Television Fixed Serv. and Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communica-
tions Act, 1995 FCC LEXIS 3972, *9 (June 15, 1995) (MM Docket No. 94-131
& PP Docket No. 93-253) (Ness, Comm'r, dissenting in part). Among other side
effects, a commitment to licensing in the public interest requires the FCC to
restrict traffic in previously granted broadcasting rights. See, e.g., Crowder v.
FCC, 399 F.2d 569, 573 & n.25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968)
(denying a license to an applicant who had been "trafficking" in broadcast
licenses-acquiring and operating stations for quick resale); 47 C.F.R. § 1.597
(1995) (presuming that a new licensee who transfers his or her license within
three years is engaging in "trafficking").
118. Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83, 91 (1957); accord
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 293
(1974); United States v. Dixie Highway Express, Inc., 389 U.S. 409, 411-12
(1967) (per curiam); cf United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co.,
326 U.S. 236, 241 (1945) (permitting an agency to decide whether "the public
interest requires that future... needs be assured rather than left uncertain").
119. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1940).
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facilities. In FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc.,2 ' the Com-
mission approved a proposal to lay two new transatlantic circuits
linking the United States with Portugal and the Netherlands.
On judicial review, RCA argued that the then-existing network
of 104 overseas circuits (including sixty-five owned and operated
by RCA) obviated the need for "duplicate circuits."' 2 ' The
Supreme Court vacated the FCC's decision, demanding that the
agency and the winning applicant demonstrate some "tangible
benefits" that would offset the public burden of financing
duplicate facilities and the private injury to incumbent communi-
cations licensees: "Merely to assume that competition is bound
to be of advantage, in an industry so regulated and so largely
closed as is this one, is not enough." 12
2
This hostile attitude toward competition has not always
dominated mass communications law. During the Golden Age
of Radio, FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station'2 expressly
held that "economic injury to an existing station is not a
separate and independent element to be taken into consideration
by the Commission in determining whether it shall grant or
withhold a [broadcast] license."" Under Sanders Brothers,
the law looked quite favorably upon new entry into the broadcast
arena. Based on this case alone, one might draw the following
conclusions about broadcast regulation:
- There is at most a limited scarcity problem in broadcasting. The
electromagnetic spectrum is scarce, not in the absolute sense that it
can be exhausted over time, but only in the limited sense that the
potential for crowding at any moment undermines the unregulated
market's ability to allocate rights rationally."n
- Broadcasting never was a natural monopoly in the sense that costs
of production decline over all relevant ranges of production. Nor does
the Communications Act authorize broadcast regulation on a monopoly
rationale. Broadcast facilities do not function as common carriers and
120. 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
121. Id. at 87-88.
122. Id. at 97; accord Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
123. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
124. Id. at 476.
125. See id. at 474 ("The attempt by a broadcaster to use a given frequency
in disregard of its prior use by others, thus creating confusion and interference,
deprives the public of the full benefit of radio audition.... The fundamental
purpose of Congress... was the allocation and regulation of the use of radio
frequencies ....").
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are not licensed as such.126
- Broadcast licensing presumptively follows the model of "free
competition."m There is no expectation that competition will fail to
materialize altogether or that competition, once triggered, will self-
destruct and lead eventually to natural monopoly. The FCC has
neither the responsibility nor the authority to set rates or to engage in
other forms of price or income regulation.'2
- The FCC should do little more than ensure that license applicants
and proposed license transferees are fit, willing, and able to exploit
their share of scarce spectrum. In this highly competitive market,
regulation need not and should not displace business judgment.
Congress, in short, "intended to leave competition in the business of
broadcasting where it found it, to permit a licensee ... to survive or
succumb according to his ability to make his programs attractive to the
public."" Perhaps even more important, the FCC should not regulate
programming content or viewpoint, the nonprice means by which the
industry competes. 3 '
- A broadcast license is by terms temporary. Licensees cannot and
should not expect renewal."'
Under these assumptions, the FCC has a very limited
mission. If technological change ever enabled the industry to
circumvent the bottleneck of finite broadcasting frequencies, the
FCC, thus deprived of its raison d'9tre, would have to wither
away. In Sanders Brothers, as in other decisions during the
twilight of the New Deal," 2 the Supreme Court firmly "assert-
126. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1994) ("[A] person engaged in radio broadcasting
shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.");
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 589 n.14 (1981) (noting that radio
broadcasters are not common carriers); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470,474 (1940). Compare 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-335 (1994) (provisions relating
to radio broadcasting, including television), as amended by Telecommunications
Act, supra note 2, with 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-228 (1994) (provisions relating to
common carriers), as amended by Telecommunications Act, supra note 2.
127. Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 474-75.
128. Id. at 474 (noting the absence of the hallmarks of railroad regulation
and other forms of traditional public utility regulation-comprehensive
regulation of entry, "wasteful practices," and "rates and charges").
129. Id. at 475.
130. Cf 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1994) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be understood
or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship ... and no
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which
shall interfere with the right of free speech. .. ").
131. See id. § 309(h)(1) ("The station license shall not vest in the licensee
any right to operate the station nor any right in the use of the frequencies
designated in the license beyond the term thereof."); Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at
475 ("The policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have anything in the
nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license.").
132. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Associated Indus. of N.Y., Inc. v. Ickes, 134
F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
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ed that competitive harm as a consequence of agency action was
not a sufficient basis for standing to challenge agency deci-
sions."' Contemporaneous observers hailed Sanders Brothers
as the "collapse of the public utility analogy" in federal communi-
cations law."3 As late as 1957, the Commission declared itself
powerless to consider the economic effect of a new broadcast
license on existing licensees.'35
But broadcast licensing after Sanders Brothers followed a far
different path.' Indeed, later decisions systematically dis-
mantled every aspect of Sanders Brothers and introduced an
element of incumbent protection contrary not only to the
Communications Act,17 but also the First Amendment.'
B. INCUMBENCY HAS ITS PRMLEGES
How did federal communications law come to treat broadcast
licensing as though it carried enormous significance for the
industrial organization of mass media markets? The answer lies
in the equating of program quality and diversity (factors at the
heart of the FCC's regulatory mission) with broadcaster identity
(a factor that is arguably ultra vires but not expressly banned by
the Communications Act). In practice, such a focus on broad-
caster identity falls naturally on the broadcaster likeliest to be
before the Commission: an incumbent.
True to their traditional role as vindicators of individual
rights, but not necessarily faithful to the true meaning of the
"public interest" standard, the courts have taken special care to
safeguard incumbent licensees. In Carroll Broadcasting Co. v.
133. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 1189, 1269 (1986).
134. Paul M. Segal & Harry P. Warner, "Ownership" of Broadcasting
Frequencies: A Review, 19 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 111, 118 (1947); see also Note,
Economic Injury in FCC Licensing: The Public Interest Ignored, 67 YALE L.J.
135, 136 n.5 (1957) (condemning Sanders Bros. as an abdication of the
Commission's mandate to regulate entry on a public interest model).
135. See In re Southeastern Enters., 22 F.C.C. 605, 610-12 (1957); H.R. REP.
No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-99 (1957).
136. See generally Harvey J. Levin, Federal Control of Entry in the
Broadcasting Industry, 5 J.L. & EcoN. 49 (1962).
137. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(h)(1) (1994).
138. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 106 (1980) ("[Ins have a way
of wanting to make sure the outs stay out."); cf Lillian BeVier, Money and
Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform,
73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1074-76 (1985) (arguing that restraints on campaign
contributions and expenditures favor incumbents).
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FCC,'3 9 the D.C. Circuit reintroduced the idea that the FCC
could and should consider economic injury to existing broadcast-
ers. The court's rationale was a classic restatement of the
excessive competition argument that had been perfect in
transportation law:
[T]he question whether a station makes $5,000, or $10,000, or $50,000
is a matter in which the public has no interest so long as service is not
adversely affected; service may well be improved by competition. But,
if the situation in a given area is such that available revenue will not
support good service in more than one station, the public interest may
well be in the licensing of one rather than two stations. To license two
stations where there is revenue for only one may result in no good
service at all. So economic injury to an existing station, while not in
and of itself a matter of moment, becomes important when on the facts
it spells diminution or destruction of service. At that point the element
of injury ceases to be a matter of purely private concern. 40
Eventually, perceiving a public economic interest in
preserving incumbent's sunk investment-backed expectations,
Congress and the courts engineered an even more spectacular
reversal of Sanders Brothers' disdain for static market structure.
The FCC's first-ever denial of a renewal application in 1965'4'
touched off a series of legislative and administrative efforts to
codify an explicit "renewal expectancy" in contested licensing
proceedings. Despite initial resistance, the D.C. Circuit
eventually acceded in an administrative presumption favoring
incumbents in comparative renewal proceedings." The
otherwise deregulatory Telecommunications Act of 1996 has
expressly codified a renewal expectancy in broadcast licensing. 4 '
139. 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
140. Id. at 443.
141. See In re WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), affd, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
142. See generally Louis L. Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License
Renewals, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1969).
143. See Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1214 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), vacating Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings Involving
Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970); see also Central Fla.
Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (chastising the FCC for
creating a de facto presumption of renewal), vacating In re Cowles Fla.
Broadcasting, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 372 (1976), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979).
144. See Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983). For a thumbnail history of this policy, see
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 782-83 & n.5,
805-07 (1978).
145. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 204(a), 110 Stat. at 112-13
(adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) and amending 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)).
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The RKO General litigation, an epic struggle spanning
nearly two decades, 46 illustrates the extraordinary nature of
a renewal application denial. In 1980, the FCC finally acted on
a renewal application filed by RKO General, Inc., for WNAC-TV
in Boston. 47 Describing a broadcast license as a valuable
privilege, the FCC denied the renewal application based on a
substantial record of misconduct by the licensee and its parent
company, General Tire. The misconduct included reciprocal
trade practices consisting of anticompetitive ties between
General Tire sales and advertising on RKO stations, improper
political contributions, fraud against other corporate affiliates,
improper payments to foreign officials, the filing of misleading
financial reports, and a "lack of candor" in FCC proceedings.'49
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial, but solely on the "lack of
candor" ground. 5 The court then remanded the FCC's deci-
sion to deny renewal of RKO's Los Angeles and New York
licenses, on the theory that those stations might "deserve
different treatment."' 5' On remand, the FCC renewed what
had been the New York license after RKO agreed to move its
station to northern New Jersey.'52
The historical trend is clear: given any opportunity to do so,
the FCC will favor established licensees on the assumption that
their expertise or, more accurately, the stability attained by
avoiding involuntary changes in ownership, will outweigh any
gains from an infusion of new economic actors, new capital, or
new technology. Today, one can measure the limited success of
the FCC's regulatory strategy by either of two gauges: First,
146. See RKO Gen., Inc. v. FCC, 670 F.2d 215, 218-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(tracing the procedural history of the case), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982),
457 U.S. 1119 (1982), 469 U.S. 1017 (1984); Fidelity Television Inc. v. FCC, 515
F.2d 684, 688-93 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (providing a history of the RKO General
litigation), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975).
147. See In re RKO Gen., Inc. (WNAC-TV), 78 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
148. Id. at 3 (concluding that RKO General would not operate its station in
a "proper and law-abiding fashion consistent with the public interest").
149. Id. at 3-5.
150. Cf FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946) (upholding the FCC's
refusal to renew a radio license belonging "to an applicant guilty of a systematic
course of deception"). Compare RKO Gen., Inc., 670 F.2d at 228-36 (rejecting
the FCC's other grounds for denying the renewal application) with id. at 221-28
(upholding the FCC's "lack of candor" findings).
151. RKO Gen., Inc., 670 F.2d at 237.
152. See In re RKO Gen., Inc., 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 469 (1983), affd sub
nom. Multi-State Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 728 F.2d 1519 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984).
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broadcast television is constantly losing audiences to competing
providers of audiovisual programming, such as cable, pay-per-
view, direct broadcast satellite, and even video rentals. Sec-
ond, traditional television programming, whether supplied by the
networks or by local affiliates is simply dreary. In this regard,
"57 Channels (and Nothing On)" is more than a rock 'n' roll
anthem.'53 It is a bitter indictment of federal mass communi-
cations law. We're bored, bored in the U.S.A.1
4
C. LOCALISM AND LETDOWN
For many years, the FCC's predominant, but by no means
exclusive, method for shaping content and viewpoint diversity
through broadcast licensing was its localism policy.155 As far
back as FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 5 ' a 1940 Supreme
Court decision handed down in the same Term as Sanders
Brothers, the Commission denied applications on the grounds
that a particular "applicant did not sufficiently represent local
interests in the community which the proposed station was to
serve."' Fifteen years later, in FCC v. Allentown Broadcast-
ing Corp., ' the Court expressly held that the "distribution of
a... license to a community in order to secure local competition
for originating and broadcasting programs of local interest" fell
"within the [Commission's] allowable area of discretion"'5 9 to
make "a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio
servie" .160service" among different localities.
During the golden age of localism, FCC policy on broadcast
licensing focused on no fewer than four distinct objectives, all
thought to be mutually reinforcing: (1) local ownership and
control, (2) viewpoint diversity in programming, (3) public
service, and (4) competitive market structure, defined as the
dispersion of ownership and the avoidance of industrial concen-
153. Hear BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, 57 Channels (and Nothing On), on HUMAN
TOUCH (Columbia 1992).
154. Hear BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Born in the U.S.A. on BORN IN THE U.S.A.
(Columbia 1984).
155. See, e.g., FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 360
(1955).
156. 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
157. Id. at 139.
158. 349 U.S. 358 (1955).
159. Id. at 362.
160. 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1994), quoted in Allentown Broadcasting, 349 U.S.
at 360 n.1, 362 n.4.
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tration.' 6 ' In practice, however, these objectives clashed.
Even before new avenues for mass communications emerged, the
FCC's localism policy flopped. Early criticism focused on the
economic realities of program production costs and advertising
revenues. 62 Despite local ownership, VHF stations tended to
become affiliates of the national networks, while technologically
inferior UIF stations turned to nationwide syndication of reruns
and movies.163 Local advertising generated a small share of
local stations' revenues and, in any event, bore no relation to the
origin of the programming. If anything, there may have been a
negative correlation. Entertainment and athletic talent of
national or international magnitude attracts more viewership
and generates more advertising revenue.'" Moreover, produc-
tion costs for local programming are prohibitively high,'65 with
the salient exception of local news broadcasts. 66 Local audi-
ences simply are not profitable enough to offset the loss-of-scale
economies in program production.
This combination of low revenue and high cost in local
programming converted the FCC's modest success in ensuring
local ownership into a lethal weapon against its other objectives.
Viewer choice in broadcast television programming dwindled as
locally owned stations aired programs originated at the national
level. Networks and programming syndicates tightened their
grip on local stations. 167 And to the extent a notion of public
service depends on responsiveness to a particular geographic
audience, localism did not appear to fulfill this mandate.
161. See ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., EcONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION
REGULATION 99 (1973).
162. See generally id. at 98-120.
163. See id. at 101-04, 187.
164. See id. at 110; cf NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 93 (1984)
(describing the NCAA fee schedule for collegiate football broadcasts under which
"national telecasts [were] the most valuable, regional telecasts [were] less
valuable, and Division II or Division HI games command[ed] a still lower
price").
165. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers & Distribs. v.
FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 533 (2d Cir. 1975).
166. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 161, at 111 (explaining that local news is
profitable because it draws viewership and is cheap to produce); cf Volokh,
supra note 31, at 1833 (describing "talk shows, talking heads shows such as the
McLaughlin Group, stand-up comedy, and some kinds of sporting events" as
types of "video programming [that] costs relatively little to produce").
167. See generally National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
196, 224 (1943) (upholding the FCC's authority to adopt regulations affecting
relationships with broadcast networks and their local affiliates).
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Although the FCC "did not even attempt to maximize the
number of television stations available to American households,"
the localism policy did succeed in "placing at least one transmit-
ter in as many ... [congressional districts] as possible."16
Similarly, the FCC's efforts to deconcentrate local broadcast
ownership has had at best a marginal impact on program
diversity. Historically, the FCC permitted a very limited degree
of multiple ownership of broadcast stations-"[n]o more than
seven AM, seven FM, and seven TV stations" in the one owner's
hands-"as a reluctant abandonment ... of the objective of
completely local ownership."'69 Faced with the market domi-
nance of the broadcast networks in the pre-cable era, however,
group stations achieved no greater success in program acquisi-
tion or development than their individually owned counter-
parts. 7
0
Eventually, the same economic pressures that dissipated the
localism initiative led the FCC to relax its traditional "Rule of
Seven." A new "Rule of Twelve," adopted in 1984, allowed any
one owner to hold an interest in as many as twelve stations
reaching no more than twenty-five percent of the national
television audience.'7 ' Contrary to the original premises of
broadcast regulation, the FCC grudgingly conceded that group
ownership may well enhance program diversity by allowing a
group of affiliated stations to pool their resources for program
development or acquisition, or even for the establishment of a
miniature "network."'
Communications law reform has taken the Commission's
retreat from multiple ownership restrictions to its logical
conclusion. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 has lifted all
ceilings on "the number of AM or FM broadcast stations which
may be owned or controlled by one entity nationally." 173 A
single entity may own or control an unlimited number of
168. Thomas G. Krattenaaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amend-
ment Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719,
1736 (1995).
169. NOLL ET AL., supra note 161, at 104.
170. See Harvey J. Levin, Competition, Diversity, and the Television Group
Ownership Rule, 70 COLUm. L. REV. 791, 794-805 (1970).
171. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1)-(2) (1995).
172. See Multiple Ownership of AM, FM & Television Broadcast Stations,
100 F.C.C.2d 17, 31-37 (1984).
173. Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 202(a), 110 Stat. at 110.
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broadcast television stations, 74 as long as those stations reach
no more than thirty-five percent of the national audience.' 5
Multiple ownership rules are but one device for ensuring
diversity, and a rather crude one at that. The closely related
duopoly and one-to-a-market rules are similarly flawed. The
FCC's duopoly rule limits the amount of overlap between signals
of commonly owned TV, AM, or FM stations.'76 The one-to-a-
market rule restricts any ownership group to one broadcast
outlet of each type in a single market."' Like the former Rule
of Seven, the one-to-a-market rule has relaxed in response to the
emergence of highly diverse, highly competitive local information
markets. Under its original twenty-five markets/thirty voices
standard, the FCC routinely entertained requests to waive the
one-to-a-market rule in the twenty-five largest media markets if
the market at issue had at least thirty different broadcast
"voices," defined as distinct owners of broadcasting facilities." s
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 now directs the FCC to
"extend this waiver policy to any of the top 50 markets, consis-
tent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
" 179
Problems of definition carve a substantial loophole in this
body of broadcast ownership restrictions. The recently repealed
Rule of Twelve, the duopoly rule, and the one-to-a-market rule
do not apply unless the facilities in question can "be attributed
to their holders."' Time and again, media conglomerates
have evaded these rules by manipulating the Commission's
"attribution rules." A conglomerate wishing to annex new
broadcast holdings has every incentive to enter joint ventures
with smaller firms, which can claim formal ownership of an
FCC-licensed broadcast facility. Although the Commission
attempts to monitor "actual working control in whatever manner
174. See id. § 202(c)(1)(A), 110 Stat. at 111 (eliminating restrictions on the
number of television stations that one person or entity may own).
175. See id. § 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 111 (increasing the national audience
reach limitation for television stations to 35%).
176. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (1994).
177. See id. § 73.3555(c).
178. See § 73.3555(c) n.7(l); Broadcast Multiple Ownership Rules, 4 F.C.C.R.
1741 (1988).
179. Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 202(d), 110 Stat. at 111.
180. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 n.2 (1995). See generally Report & Order, 97
F.C.C.2d 997 (1984) (reviewing and revising standards for attributing interests
in broadcast, cable television, and newspaper properties under the FCC's
multiple ownership and cross-ownership rules).
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exercised,"' 8 ' the flexible, fact-intensive nature of the attribu-
tion inquiry'82 effectively invites television moguls to expand
their empires, one partially owned but "unattributed" station at
a time. Faced with the increasing unworkability of its attribu-
tion rules, the FCC has launched a comprehensive review.8 3
In a hotly contested proceeding, the FCC recently attributed
ownership of a Green Bay, Wisconsin, television station to Savoy
Pictures Entertainment, Inc., rather than Fox Television
Stations, Inc., an affiliate of Fox Broadcasting Company and a
holder of eight television licenses.'" The FCC declined to
attribute the Green Bay station to Fox, a "finding [that] could
[have] potentially affect[ed] Fox's compliance with the
Commission's multiple ownership rules,"' but reserved the
right to revisit this decision after reviewing the attribution
rules. 8 6
Moreover, during the ascendancy of multiple ownership
regulation, the FCC was willing to sacrifice its multiple owner-
ship restrictions to the extent that the Rule of Twelve obstructed
the competing goal of advancing minority broadcasters. The
Rule of Twelve was actually a Rule of Fourteen: A single owner
could command fourteen "minority-controlled" television stations
reaching as much as thirty percent of the national audience.'87
Evidently the Commission believed that the marginal increase
in racial diversity outweighs the risk that greater concentration
in station ownership would further homogenize television
programming.'8s When combined with the attribution rules,
181. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 n.1 (1995).
182. See, e.g., In re Univision Holdings, 7 F.C.C.R. 6672, 6675 (1992)
(focusing on the circumstances surrounding a newly formed joint venture); In
re Stereo Broadcasters, Inc., 87 F.C.C.2d 87, 95-96 (1981) (examining a minority
shareholder's ability to direct a joint venture's financial, personnel, and
programming decisions); In re Stereo Broadcasters, Inc., 55 F.C.C.2d 819, 821
(1975) (requiring a study of all "special circumstances presented").
183. In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution of
Broadcast Interests, 10 F.C.C.R. 3606, 1607 (1995).
184. In re BBC License Subsidiary L.P. & SF Green Bay License Subsidiary,
Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 7926, 7928, 7931-32 (1995).
185. Id. at 7932.
186. Id. at 7933; see also In re Paramount Stations Group of Philadelphia,
Inc. & Fox Television Stations, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 10,963, 10,963 (1995) (declining
to reexamine Green Bay's conclusion that Fox holds no attributable interest in
stations owned by the Fox-Savoy joint venture).
187. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1)(ii), (e)(2)(i) (1995).
188. See In re Policies & Rules Regarding Minority & Female Ownership of
Mass Media Facilities, 10 F.C.C.R. 2788, 2796 (1995) (asserting that further
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the FCC's solicitude for minority broadcasters gave media
conglomerates yet another opportunity to evade and thereby to
dilute multiple ownership and anticoncentration rules. The FCC
has proposed a rule that would eliminate attribution of owner-
ship to any other participant in a joint venture as long as "a
minority or female individual or entity or group of individuals or
entities holds more than 50 percent of the voting stock of a
corporate broadcast licensee... with at least 15 percent of the
company's equity."'89 Under this proposal, one media giant,
Tribune Broadcasting Company, acquired minority-controlled
television stations in Atlanta and New Orleans even though
recognition of an "attributable interest in [those] stations would
[have] place[d] Tribune in violation of the ... duopoly rule in
both markets."' 90
The localism, multiple ownership, one-to-a-market, and
duopoly policies all rest on the assumption that mere
deconcentration will enhance program diversity. Perhaps
counterintuitively, economic analysis of broadcasting has long
recognized that monopoly control of all channels in any locality
might well lead to more diverse and qualitatively "better"
programming.' 9' A monopoly owner of multiple television
stations in one market might broadcast different programs on
each channel merely to deter entry by would-be competitors for
viewers' scarce time, 92 but the result is comparable. Regard-
less of the broadcaster's motivations, the audience receives a
more diverse palette of viewing options. This positive correlation
between concentration and diverse programming testifies to the
unpredictability of regulatory strategies that aim to offset
consolidation of station ownership would not harm competition in the industry
or threaten viewpoint diversity).
189. Id. at 2794. In its ongoing review of its attribution rules, the
Commission has invited additional proposals for increasing minority and female
ownership. In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribu-
tion of Broadcast Interests, 10 F.C.C.R. 3606, 3614 (1995).
190. FCC Report No. MM 95-117, 1995 WL 736785 (FCC Conditionally
Grants the Applications for Acquisition of Television Stations by Qwest
Broadcasting L.L.C.) (Dec. 12, 1995).
191. See generally Spitzer, supra note 64, at 304-19; Peter 0. Steiner,
Program Patterns and Preferences and the Workability of Competition in Radio
Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194, 219-21 (1952).
192. Cf Richard Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal
Industry, 9 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 305 (1978) (arguing that dominant
firms sometimes create or continue unprofitable product lines to keep would-be
competitors from entering and eroding profitable markets).
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uneven levels of market power in distinct sectors of a coordinat-
ed industry. Therein lies the inherent instability of any strategy
rooted in countervailing power, an economic prescription known
to be "indeterminate with a vengeance." 93
There are two additional reasons to lessen our fear of
concentration. First, a monopolist may have deeper pockets (or
at least cheaper access to credit) and can therefore afford to buy
more expensive talent. The presence of such a developmental
war chest is exceedingly important in the risk-driven world of
entertainment program development-or any enterprise where
"there is little more relation between the investment and the
results than in a game of poker."' 94 Second, and more impor-
tantly, competing broadcasters will tend to duplicate popular
programming in an effort to capture their share of the main-
stream audience. By contrast, a monopolist would never
duplicate programming in any locality, preferring instead to air
shows that attract audiences not served outside the main-
stream. 95
In an increasingly diverse landscape of leisure options,'96
only concentrated broadcasters can attain the scale needed to
garner and market high-quality programming. The same
diversification of viewers' tastes and viewers' options also
disciplines broadcasters-monopolists and nonmonopolists
alike-into satisfying audience demand. (Broadcast television's
loss of market share has improved the quality of network
television, "if only because with any given episode there's so
much less at stake financially.")' 97 In 1995, in the shadow of
impending legislative reform, the FCC announced plans to
review, perchance to overhaul, the multiple ownership, duopoly,
and one-to-a-market rules that have aided and abetted the fifty-
year flirtation with localism.'98 Thanks to the new Telecom-
193. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
EcoNoMIc PERFORMANCE 519 (3d ed. 1990).
194. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 649 (1944) (separate
opinion of Jackson, J.).
195. See sources cited supra note 191.
196. Seegenerally HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENTINDUSTRYECONOMIcs:
A GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1994) (documenting drastic changes
in consumer uses of leisure time between 1970 and 1990).
197. Charles McGrath, The Triumph of the Prime-Time Novel, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Oct. 22, 1995, at 52; see also id. at 52-53 ('Television can afford to take
chances, and often enough it does.").
198. In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television
Broadcasting, 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, 3526-29 (1995).
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munications Act, such comprehensive review of the broadcast
ownership rules is now a statutory obligation.' 99
D. ACROPHOBIA AND VERTIGO
1. Big as Hell 200
Perhaps the most astonishing aspect of the failed localism
initiative was its hidden impact on the structure of the television
industry's transmission sector. Between the end of World War
II and the birth of Fox Broadcasting Company's "fourth"
network,20 ' the localism policy effectively fixed the number of
national television networks at three.2°2 Although the FCC's
own studies demonstrated the feasibility of a six-channel
nationwide television system,2°3 the Commission's obsession
with local ownership foreclosed a policy that would have doubled
the number of viewing options during the pre-cable era.
Even more puzzling, as the FCC was pursuing its self-
defeating localism policy, it simultaneously was cultivating a
separate, contradictory sphere of jurisdiction. Well before the
obsession with localism reached fever pitch in Allentown
Broadcasting,2 °4 the FCC recognized that an increasing
amount of programming was not being locally produced, but
199. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 202(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 111
(directing the FCC to "conduct a rulemaking proceeding to determine whether
to retain, modify, or eliminate its limitations on the number of television
stations that a person or entity may own, operate, or control, or have a
cognizable interest in, within the same television market"); id. § 202(h), 110
Stat. at 111-12 (ordering the FCC to review "all of its ownership rules
biennially" to "determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the public
interest as a result of competition"); id. § 402(a), 110 Stat. at 129 (adding 47
U.S.C. § 161, which requires a biennial FCC review of "all regulations issued
under [the Communications] Act" to "determine whether any such regulation
is no longer necessary in the public interest as the result of meaningful
economic competition between providers of such service").
200. Watch NETWORK (United Artists 1976) ("I'm mad as hell, and Im not
going to take it anymore!").
201. See infra text accompanying notes 247-254 and 462-478 (discussing the
birth of Fox Broadcasting as a full-fledged network).
202. STANLEY M. BESEN ET AL., MISREGULATING TELEVISION: NETWORK
DOMINANCE AND THE FCC 14-15 (1984); THOMAS G. KRATrENMAKER & LUCAS
A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 88, 283-84 (1995);
Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 168, at 1736.
203. See, e.g., FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1969, at 135, 137 (1969); NOLL ET AL., supra note 161, at
118-20.
204. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955).
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purchased from national syndicates. After the Commission
promulgated its first rules regulating "chain broadcasting"-the
"simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or
more connected stations"2 5 -CBS and NBC immediately
challenged this extension of the FCC's jurisdiction. °6
In a landmark decision, National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 207 the Supreme Court upheld the "chain broadcasting"
rules. Those regulations eventually evolved into today's familiar
rules regarding network affiliation208 and station owner-
ship,2 9 territorial exclusivity,20 the division of the broadcast
day,21' and network influence over programming and advertis-
ing decisions.1 2 The decision also marked the birth of the
ABC network, as NBC divested its Blue network in the face of
the FCC's rule against dual network operation.2 3 In a striking
mirror image of the Court's later strategy in Phillips Petroleum
205. 47 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1994); see also id. § 303(i) (authorizing the FCC to
issue "special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain
broadcasting"); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194
n.1 (1943) ("In actual practice, programs are transmitted by wire... from their
point of origination to each station in the network for simultaneous broadcast
over the air."); cf DAVID BOWIE, Station to Station, on STATION TO STATION
(RCA 1976) ("[Y]ou drive like a demon from station to station.").
206. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 408
(1942) (challenging the FCC's authority to issue "chain broadcasting" rules);
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 447, 448 (1942) (same).
207. 319 U.S. 190, 224-27 (1943).
208. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(a) (1995) (exclusive affiliation of stations).
209. See id. § 73.658(f) (network ownership of stations). At one time, the
FCC also banned cross-ownership of a broadcast network and a cable system.
See id. § 76.501 (cross-ownership). The Telecommunications Act of 1996 has
lifted that restriction. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 202(f), 110
Stat. at 111.
210. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.132 (1995) (AM radio); id. § 73.232 (FM); id.
§ 73.658(b) (TV); cf id. § 73.3555(a) (duopoly rule).
211. See id. § 73.658(d) (station commitment of broadcast time); cf. id.
§ 73.658(k) (prime-time access rule).
212. See id. § 73.768(e) (right to reject programs); id. § 73.768(h) (network
control of affiliates advertising rates).
213. ABC grew out of NBC's Blue Network. The original Red network
became what we today know as NBC. See LEONARD H. GOLDENSON & MARVIN
J. WOLF, BEATING THE ODDS: THE UNTOLD STORY BEHIND THE RISE OF ABC 96-
97 (1991); STERLING QUINLAN, INSIDE ABC: AMERICAN BROADCASTING
COMPANY'S RISE TO POWER 20 (1979); see also National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 208 (1943) (declining to review the FCC's dual
network rule because NBC's divestiture of its Blue network had eliminated any
"immediate threat of [the rule's] enforcement"); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 44 F. Supp. 688, 691 (S.D.N.Y.) (Hand, J.) (noting NBC's
divestiture of its second network), rev'd, 316 U.S. 447 (1942).
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Co. v. Wisconsin, 14 which thrust the Federal Power Commis-
sion into the business of regulating natural gas prices at the
wellhead,215 the NBC decision leveraged the FCC's jurisdiction
over local broadcasters into a vastly wider mandate to curb
network power.
NBC represented the high-water mark of the FCC's
offensive against vertical integration and coordination in mass
communications. The Court's rejection of NBC's First Amend-
ment argument proved especially enduring; Justice Frankfurter's
description of "the limited facilities of radio" as over-the-air
broadcasting's "unique characteristic""6  would eventually
ossify into the "scarcity" rationale used to justify extraordinary
suppression of speech on the airwaves." Since 1943, however,
laws designed to curb network activities and influence have beat
a constant and rather humiliating retreat. One of the most
dramatic examples is the rule against dual network opera-
tion.21 The only chain broadcasting rule that NBC did not
contest before the Supreme Court has fallen to the deregulatory
razor of communications reform.219
To the extent that the other rules at issue in NBC have
survived, they serve primarily as devices for controlling televi-
sion networks. Network programming in commercial radio has
gradually dwindled from formerly comprehensive control to the
provision of spot news and information segments. Persuaded
that restrictive regulation of radio networks had become
outdated, the FCC in 1977 eliminated all rules regarding
214. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
215. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MAcVOY, ENERGY
REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 56-59 (1974) (describing the
Federal Power Commission's regulation of natural gas producers after Phillips
Petroleum).
216. NBC, 319 U.S. at 226.
217. E.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984);
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101
(1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
218. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(g) (1994).
219. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 202(e), 110 Stat. at 111
(directing the FCC to revise its dual network rule); see also Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference, H. CONF. REP. No. 458, 104th Cong.,
2d Sess. 163, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 176 (March 1996) [hereinafter
Conference Report] (explaining that the relaxation of the dual network rule
retains regulatory barriers to simultaneous or geographically coordinated
operation of "(1) two or more of the four existing networks (ABC, CBS, NBC,
FOX) or, (2) any of the four existing networks of the two emerging networks[]
(WBTN, UPN)").
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exclusive affiliation, term of affiliation, option time, program
rejection, and network control over station rates in radio.220
The only rules in effect for radio networks restrict territorial
exclusivity.221 If there is centralized control of radio program-
ming today, such control rests in the hands of BMI, ASCAP, and
other "clearinghouses" organized to coordinate the licensing of
musical copyrights.
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc.,222 the Supreme Court took a far more sanguine view of
the scale economies realized by phonorecored clearinghouses.
Impressed by the efficiencies attained by BMI and ASCAP, the
Court declined to hold that "blanket licensing" of all copyrights
handled by these organizations constitutes illegal price-fixing
under section one of the Sherman Act .2 ' The so-called per se
rule of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.221 crumbles
when it collides with economic efficiency; antitrust liability for
price-fixing evaporates when collective marketing and pricing
appear to be the most effective means for delivering a product or
service. 2' The economic wisdom of BMI decision casts grave
doubt on the case for continued FCC regulation of network
activities.
The FCC's own staff has concluded that the network activity
rules have done little to enhance local control of television
programming or to enhance diversity in viewer choice.226 In
220. Review ofCommission Rules & Regulatory Policies Concerning Network
Broadcasting by Standard (AM) & FM Broadcast Stations, 40 Radio Reg. 2d (P
& F) 80, at 97 (FCC 1977).
221. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.132, 73.232 (1995) (covering territorial exclusivity
of AM and FM respectively); see also Telecommunications Act, supra note 2,
§ 202(b), 110 Stat. at 110-11 (allowing a single entity to own, operate, or control
as many as eight commercial stations in any one radio market).
222. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
223. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
224. 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
225. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9, 16, 19-20 (stating that a practice
that effectively increases economic efficiency should not automatically be
invalidated under the per se rule); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van
Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 226-28 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (same), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1033 (1987); see also National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) ("Broadcast Music squarely holds that a joint
selling arrangement may be so efficient that it will increase sellers' aggregate
output and thus be procompetitive.").
226. See generally FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COmi'N, NEW TELEVISION
NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 467-85 (Final
Report of the Network Inquiry Special Staff, Oct. 1980).
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any event, by reducing the profitability of centralized program
development, the rules have perversely deterred entry by new
networks. This loss falls disproportionately on markets too
small to sustain cable and other subscription services. Indeed,
the real complaint with network activity regulation arguably
stems from the long history of FCC decisions, rooted in the
localism initiative, that kept the number of viable national
networks at three.227 Viewer choice would be enhanced by
maximizing the number of national networks, even at the
expense of reducing local control over programming.
2. Mighty Morphin Power Networks
The fate of the FCC's rules governing network participation
in program production provides further support for across-the-
board deregulation. The financial interest and syndication
rules,2" affectionately known as "finsyn," prohibited television
networks from (1) acquiring financial interests (other than the
right to air a program) in independently produced programming,
and (2) syndicating a program for off-network broadcast or
holding an interest in any syndication arrangement. The rules
arose out of a concern that the networks' financial entanglement
in programming would pressure producers to subordinate artistic
concerns to projected revenues 9.22  As a practical matter, finsyn
divided the enormous profits in program development between
the networks and independent Hollywood producers. The
networks enjoyed first-run privileges, while independent film
and video producers retain the often lucrative rights to the
reruns. In this respect, finsyn achieved a happier compromise
between the networks and the producers than did the celluloid
conspiracies that "restrict[ed] 'first-run' pictures to downtown...
theatres" and "confin[ed]... suburban theatre[s] to subsequent
runs."
231
227. See sources cited supra note 202.
228. Report & Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, 383 (1970), on reconsideration, 25
F.C.C.2d 318 (1970), affd sub noma. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442
F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971). The new temporary rules, Financial Interest &
Syndication Rules, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,547 (1993), are codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.660-73.664 (1995).
229. See Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (7th
Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.).
230. GINSBURG ET. AL., supra note 27, at 266.
231. Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 537
(1954).
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In a brilliant 1992 opinion, Judge Richard Posner threw the
finsyn rules into legal limbo.1 2 By denying producers the
ability to share risks with better financed networks, the rules
effectively channeled production business into the hands of more
established producers who could more readily ride out program
failures and negotiate better syndication deals. It is hard, Judge
Posner reasoned, to imagine how rules that actually retard entry
into the fiercely competitive and highly risky program production
sector can enhance diversity.2 13 Having lost its effort to defend
the old finsyn regime, the FCC in 1993 reevaluated and
reformulated these rules.234  After adopting regulations that
expressly contemplated the eventual repeal of finsyn,3 5 the
FCC eliminated the finsyn rules in September 1995.236
The second FCC weapon is the prime time access rule
(PTAR),237 which limits the amount of network programming
during prime hours. When coupled with the networks' historical
practice of offering only 3 hours of programming to affiliates
between 7 and 11 p.m. Eastern or Pacific time on weekdays,
PTAR reserved a half hour in this lucrative time slot for non-
network programming on network-affiliated stations.28 Since
1970, when PTAR emerged contemporaneously with finsyn, this
cap on national programming during the most lucrative portion
of the broadcast day sought to put cream-skimming networks on
a low-fat diet, ostensibly to ensure a healthy supply of whole
232. See Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1055.
233. Id. at 1051-52.
234. See Financial Interest & Syndication Rules, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,547 (1993)
(presenting FCC's modification of the finsyn rules); In re Evaluation of the
Syndication & Financial Interest Rules, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282, 3284-85 (1993)
(discussing the Commission's decision to relax the finsyn rules); Memorandum
& Opinion on Reconsideration, 8 F.C.C.R. 8270, 8270 (1993) (describing the
evaluation and eventual amendment of the finsyn rules), affd sub nom. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.).
235. See Financial Interest & Syndication Rules, 58 Fed. Reg. 28,932 (1993)
(codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.659-73.662 (1995)); Financial Interest & Syndication
Rules, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,555 (Nov. 29, 1993) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.660,
73.661, 73.663 (1995)).
236. See Network Financial Interest & Syndication Rules, 60 Fed. Reg.
48,907 (Sept. 21, 1995) (eliminating 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.659-73.661, 73.663
immediately and ordering the elimination of § 73.662 on August 30, 1996).
237. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1994); see National Ass'n of Indep. Television
Producers & Distrib. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 530-43 (2d Cir. 1975) (upholding
most of PTAR against several challenges); Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v.
FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 476-79 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding PTAR against a First
Amendment challenge).
238. NAITPD, 516 F.2d at 528-29.
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milk for station owners and local programming interests.239
From this perspective, PTAR was a hybrid of NBC's command-
and-control approach to checking network authority and the
countervailing power strategy of strengthening local
broadcasters' programming capacity.
In practice, mandatory prime time access did nothing to
improve the quality or diversity of broadcast television.
Consider the following conundrum: if "game shows" are the
answer, what is the question?2 40 "All other things being equal,
what programming will a network affiliate run on weekdays
between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m. Eastern time?"24' The FCC's own
studies showed that game shows commanded 41.9% of the 2100
half-hour access slots programmed by 150 stations during the
1973-1974 television season.24 2 A reviewing court lamented
that prime time access followed "[a] kind of Gresham's law" that
drove hapless local stations toward "game shows and animal
shows."2" As "the liveliest viewing available" to the underfi-
nanced affiliates, game shows won the war for access time "by
default."2 After a quarter-century of failure, the FCC conced-
ed that PTAR was "an imprecise, indiscriminate response" to the
Commission's regulatory concerns245 and prospectively repealed
the rule, effective August 30, 1996. 6
During their ascendancy, finsyn and PTAR defined and
debased the content of broadcast television. Whereas finsyn
channeled second-run shows toward independent outlets, PTAR
239. Cf United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 150 n.3 (1938)
(extolling "the great importance to the public health of butter fat").
240. Cf JEOPARDY! (Merv Griffin Productions 1995) (a game show in which
contestants answer trivia questions in interrogative form); Daniel A. Farber,
Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REv. 163, 163 ("If Brandeis is the answer, what was the question?").
241. See Report & Order, 44 F.C.C.2d 1081, 1082 (1974) (fixing prime-time
access to this slot in the Eastern and Pacific time zones and to 6:30-7:00 p.m.
in the Central and Mountain zones).
242. Second Report & Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 829, 876 (1975).
243. National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers & Distrib., 516 F.2d 526,
533 (2d Cir. 1975).
244. The Quiz Biz, FORBES, Apr. 1, 1975, at 48, quoted in NAITPD, 516 F.2d
at 533 n.16.
245. Radio Broadcast Services; Television Program Practices, 60 Fed. Reg.
44,773, 44,778-79 (Aug. 29, 1995).
246. See id. at 44,773, 44,780 (eliminating 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1994)); see
also id. at 44,774 (justifying "a one-year transition period" in which "parties
[could] adjust their programming strategies and business arrangements prior
to the elimination of a regulatory regime that has been in place for 25 years").
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set the terms on which network affiliates acquired their most
visible programming. From a more explicitly economic perspec-
tive, the rules have curbed the networks' profitability, but
regulatory effectiveness of this sort had its costs. Finsyn and
PTAR plainly deterred entry by new networks. To create a
fourth major television network, the Fox Broadcasting Company
built a massive war chest for battle with the Big Three-$1.8
billion between 1987 and January 30, 1990.24 Even this was
not enough. Fox also needed a waiver from finsyn and PTAR,
whose financial burdens would fall much harder on an upstart
network than well-established incumbents such as NBC."4 A
reluctant FCC agreed, but only after extracting a promise that
Fox would direct "much of [its] proposed new programming...
[toward] children." 9 In the end, the Mighty Morphin Power
Rangers helped Fox vanquish the regulatory foe of liberated
mass media markets.
The regulatory birth of Fox Broadcasting exposes a defect
common to finsyn, PTAR, and other legal measures aimed at
curbing network influence. Although restrictions on network
activities may in the short run limit the networks' domination of
their affiliates or of independent producers, over the long run
they deter entry by hampering the profitability of the network
business. Network regulation thus devolves into a form of
protection for incumbent networks, much as entry and rate
regulation degenerate over time into an effective shelter for a
publicly franchised monopoly, even after the conditions that led
to the emergence of a natural monopoly disappear. °
The collapse of finsyn and PTAR has spurred a flurry of
activity in television. Two of the traditional broadcast networks
(ABC and CBS) have become takeover targets, while two new
networks (Warner and UPN) have joined Fox and the Big Three
in the hunt for viewers and advertiser revenues. The simulta-
neous presence of conglomerate mergers and upstart entry
testifies to the stifling influence that finsyn and PTAR had
before their reform. ABC's and CBS's new owners, Disney and
Westinghouse, both hold substantial interests in program
247. GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 27, at 263.
248. In re Fox Broadcasting Co., 5 F.C.C.R. 3211, 3212 (1990).
249. Id. at 3212.
250. Cf Posner, supra note 70, at 611-15.
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production.25' Thanks to the fall of finsyn and PTAR, media
conglomerates will be able to profit directly from the first-run
and subsequent broadcasts of shows produced in-house. Disney's
acquisition of Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. is almost surely attribut-
able to this regulatory change. 2
At the opposite end of the network club, the new finsyn
rules' explicit exemptions for "emerging networks"25 have
created the market niche now occupied by Warner and UPN-a
niche that did not and could not exist until the Fox petition
turned the 1990s into the decade of the upstart television
network. Coupled with the traditional networks' retreat from
market dominance, these new networks' success supplied the
final push that toppled finsyn and PTAR.254 The death of
these rules will continue to spark the very sort of competitive
change that escaped the regulatory imagination of the NBC
decision.
E. REGULATION IS THE MIDWIFE OF INVENTION
Structural regulation of mass communications has accom-
251. See David J. Jefferson & Lisa Bannon, Disney's Growing Empire: After
Biding His Time, Michael Eisner Pounces, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1995, at BI
(discussing Disney's bid for Capital Cities/ABC Inc.); Laura Landro & Elizabeth
Jensen, All Ears: Disney's Deal for ABC Makes Show Business a Whole New
World, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1995, at Al (same); Raju Narisetti et al., Westing-
house in Pact to Buy CBS, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1995, at A3.
252. See WALT DISNEY Co., NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS
25, 112-13 (Jan. 4, 1996) (numbering the repeal of finsyn and PTAR among"the
most significant regulatory changes" that will enable Disney 'to explore new
areas of growth opportunities" after merging with Capital Cities/ABC) (on file
with author).
253. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.659, 73.660, 73.661(e) (1994). An "emerging
network" is an entity that did not "provid[e] on a regular basis more than
fifteen (15) hours of prime time programming per week (exclusive of live
coverage of bona fide news events of national importance) to interconnected
affiliates that reach, in aggregate, at least seventy-five (75) percent of television
households nationwide," id. § 73.662(f), on June 6,1993, but subsequently meets
this definition. Id. § 73.662(g).
254. See Network Financial Interest & Syndication Rules, 60 Fed. Reg.
48,907, 48,911 (Sept. 21, 1995) (identifying Fox's success and Warner and UPN's
apparent viability as factors undermining the "claim that the established
networks have bottleneck power over the broadcast television distribution
system"); Radio Broadcast Services; Television Program Practices, 60 Fed. Reg.
44,773, 44,774 (Aug. 29, 1995) ("[Nleither the networks nor their affiliates
dominate video programming distribution or the video programming production
market."); id. at 44,778 ("The Commission does not believe that repeal of PTAR
will create the grounds for failure of newly-launched television networks nor for
significant slowing in their development.").
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plished nothing except to preserve former economic advantages
attained by an incumbent technology. Intermodal competi-
tion-the emergence of a technologically feasible, economically
practicable alternative-has time and again exposed this legal
flaw. Half a century ago, dissenting Supreme Court Justices
could still be heard to decry the transmogrification of "chain
broadcasting" from "a problem of technical interference" into a
full-blown pretext for network regulation. 5  Since then,
Congress has ordered the FCC to patrol virtually every commu-
nications technology bit for bit, byte for byte. From print
journalism256 to direct broadcast satellites,25 no form of mass
media can elude the Commission's regulatory grip. The ever-
widening circle of federal communications law that emanates
from its 1934 statutory core is the regulatory equivalent of
"protective jurisdiction":25 having once undertaken to regulate
one form of technology, the federal government must shape each
succeeding communications medium according to the model of
the older market, lest a novel technology unravel the regulators'
meticulous handiwork. 5 9
1. The Wired Nation26
The regulatory struggle between broadcast television and
"cablecasting" provides a telling case study. Cable technology
255. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 235-36
(1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
256. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1994) (prohibiting the grant of a television
broadcast license to a party that owns or controls a daily newspaper in the same
service area). But see News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 815
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (striking down the television/newspaper cross-ownership rule
as applied to Australian media magnate Rupert Murdoch).
257. See 47 U.S.C. § 335 (1994) (requiring the FCC to regulate video
programming by direct broadcast satellites); Telecommunications Act, supra
note 2, § 205(b), 110 Stat. at 114 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 303 to give the FCC
"exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the provision of direct-to-home satellite
services"). But see Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1,
8-10 (D.D.C. 1993) (striking down certain provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 335 as
unreasonable infringements of free speech).
258. Cf Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957)
(Burton, J. concurring); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District
Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 184-85 (1953).
259. This phenomenon is sometimes called the "tar-baby effect" of economic
regulation. James W. McKie, Regulation and the Free Market: The Problem of
Boundaries, 1 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 6, 8-9 (1970).
260. See generally RALPH L. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION (1972) (reporting on
the early days of cable as a rival of broadcast television); Ralph L. Smith, The
Wired Nation, 210 NATION 582 (1970) (same).
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emerged in the 1940s as a way "to bring broadcast television
signals to remote or mountainous communities."26' "The
purpose was not to replace broadcast television but to enhance
it."262 By the 1960s, though, cable had transformed itself into a
bona fide competitor of over-the-air television.
In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,263 several
community antenna television (CATV) systems retransmitted
Los Angeles broadcast signals into the San Diego area. Midwest
Television, a television station based in San Diego, obtained an
FCC order limiting the CATV systems' service to those areas
they had conquered by February 15, 1966.2' The Supreme
Court upheld the order.265 The Court's putative holding-that
the FCC's jurisdiction over "all interstate and foreign communi-
cation by wire or radio"266 encompassed CATV-seemed too
easy and too obvious. The Court all but confessed the policy's
real purpose: checking the "unregulated explosive growth of
CATV"267 to stem the flow of revenues away from UHF and
educational television broadcasters-the foundations of "an
appropriate system of local broadcasting."26  Within four
years, the cable industry negotiated a "consensus" tailored to
appease the broadcast networks and their local affiliates.269
The negotiated peace did not last. The first fifteen years
after Southwestern Cable witnessed several further skirmishes,
none decisive, between broadcasting and cablecasting. But the
Court had already endorsed a profoundly anticompetitive
agenda. As in NBC, a new communications powerhouse
menaced the interlaced market structure that the FCC had
woven; nascent CATV empires in 1968 were on the verge of
reviving the threat that broadcast networks posed in 1943.
261. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2451 (1994).
262. Id. See generally DANIEL L. BRENNER & MONROE E. PRICE, CABLE
TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO: LAW AND POLICY § 1.02 (1992)
(explaining the early history and purposes of cable television).
263. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
264. Id. at 160.
265. Id. at 181.
266. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1994).
267. H.R. REP. No. 1635, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1966).
268. 392 U.S. at 174; see also H.R. REP. No. 1635, supra note 267 at 7
(describing the regulation of cable as essential to the preservation of traditional
telecasters' revenues).
269. See generally Stanley M. Besen, The Economics of the Cable Television
"Consensus," 17 J.L. & EcON. 39, 43-46 (1974) (discussing how the cable
consensus limited cable programming, especially in the top 50 markets).
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Southwestern Cable accordingly ratified the FCC's efforts to
regulate CATV's carriage of broadcast signals across boundaries
between existing television license territories. The pungent odor
of incumbent protection permeated Southwestern Cable, much as
it did in the cases that gutted Sanders Brothers and created a
"renewal expectancy" in broadcast licensing.27°
Days after deciding Southwestern Cable, however, the
Supreme Court delivered the cable industry a potential bonanza
when it ruled that CATV retransmission did not constitute
"performance" of copyrighted audiovisual works. 7' When
Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1976 to include cable
retransmission within a compulsory licensing scheme,2 72 it
redefined the broadcasting-cablecasting struggle in two signifi-
cant ways. First, by forcing cablecasters to pay retransmission
royalties, it ended the brief era during which cable operators
could free-ride off program packaging services performed by local
broadcasters. Second and more significant, the creation of a
compulsory licensing system eliminated the possibility that
broadcasters could withhold their signals from cable competitors.
Settlement of the copyright issue consequently enhanced the
significance of the continuing battle between broadcasting and
cablecasting.
Despite having fallen within the federal government's
regulatory reach, cablecasting enjoyed some significant victories
in the fifteen years after Southwestern Cable. Although the FCC
in 1969 successfully adopted a rule requiring cable systems with
more than 3500 subscribers to originate local programming, 73
virtually every other effort to reshape cable in the image of
television floundered. The FCC itself retracted the mandatory
origination rule in 1974, reasoning that cable operators' self-
interest in maximizing subscription revenues proved more
effective than regulatory dictate as a motivation to produce
locally oriented programs.274  In FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp.,217 the Supreme Court repelled a far more intrusive
270. See supra text accompanying notes 141-144.
271. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390,
400-01 (1968).
272. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, tit. I, § 101, 90 Stat.
2541, 2550 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)).
273. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 653-54, 673-74
(1972).
274. See Report & Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090, 1105-06 (1974).
275. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
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assault; the Court struck down a battery of access channel
requirements as an unlawful attempt by the FCC to impose
common carrier status on large cable systems." 6
Meanwhile, the FCC repealed its distant signal and program
exclusivity rules."' Those rules limited the number of signals
cable operators could carry from outside a 35-mile local commu-
nity.7 8 They also enabled local broadcasters to delete syndi-
cated, non-network programming from signals retransmitted by
"distant" cable operators. 9  Whereas the invalidated access
channel requirements forced cable systems to share their limited
channel capacity with competitors in the video distribution
business, the distant signal and program exclusivity rules
restrained cablecasting's ability to duplicate (and eventually to
supplant) broadcast television as the primary source of video
programming for the home.
Resisting the notion that cablecasting had to serve as
handmaid to broadcasting rather than to stand as a peer, the
D.C. Circuit invalidated the FCC's 1975 rules giving television
broadcasters a right of first refusal over feature films and
sporting events that cable operators wanted to offer at premium
210prices. Significantly, in determining the free speech rights
of cable operators, the court of appeals squarely refused to apply
a First Amendment test diluted by the presumed scarcity of the
broadcast spectrum. Instead, the Court observed that "an
essential precondition of [the scarcity] theory-physical interfer-
ence and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for government-is
absent."
281
As of 1984, therefore, the cable industry had survived no
fewer than four FCC initiatives designed to cabin the explosive
growth of cablecasting: (1) mandatory origination, (2) access
channel requirements, (3) distant signal and program exclusivi-
ty, and (4) the rule against the "siphoning off' of attractive
feature films and sports events into premium cable venues.
276. See id. at 701-02, 708-09.
277. See Malrite T.V. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1152 (2d Cir. 1981) (declining
to set aside the FCC's repeal of distant signal carriage and syndicated program
exclusivity rules), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
278. See id. at 1144-45 (explaining 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b)-(e), 76.61(b)-(f), and
76.63 (1980)).
279. See id. at 1145 (explaining 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-76.161 (1980)).
280. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
281. Id. at 45.
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Ironically, some private parties were less visionary than even
the FCC in anticipating cable's profitability. The professional
sports leagues, for example, opposed rescission of the distant
signal and program exclusivity rules in the belief that cablecasts
of sporting events would diminish team profits by reducing live
attendance.2 This opposition is astonishing in retrospect,
given the vast profits that professional and collegiate sports
teams have reaped from cable.
That very year, however, the FCC resurrected the common
carrier model of cable regulation by adopting a battery of
mandatory carriage, or "must-carry," rules requiring cable
operators to transmit every over-the-air television signal that
was "significantly viewed in the community."283 Applying the
intermediate First Amendment test set out in United States v.
O'Brien,2  the D.C. Circuit invalidated the 1984 must-carry
rules as a "'grossly' overinclusive" and indiscriminate protection
of local television broadcasters under the guise of preserving
cable subscribers' access to local television broadcasts. 5 In
1986, the FCC again tried to impose must-carry obligations.8 6
Concerned that cable subscribers tend to dismantle their over-
the-air antennas, the Commission also required cable operators
to provide subscribers with an A/B switch and to educate
subscribers about the possibility of receiving over-the-air signals
not carried on the cable system. 8' The D.C. Circuit invalidat-
282. See Marite T.V.v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1150 (2d Cir. 1981); cf. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 115-17 (1984)
(describing how a rule restricting telecasts of college football
was-unpersuasively-justified as a way to protect live attendance).
283. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-76.61 (1984).
284. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (permitting the regulation of communicative
conduct "if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential").
285. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
286. See In re Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television
Systems, 1 F.C.C.R. 864 (1986) (adopting a two-part program to eliminate the
need for mandatory signal carriage regulation), modified in part, 2 F.C.C.R.
3593, rev'd sub nom. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
287. Id. An A/B switch allows a television set to receive a signal from two
different sources, such as cable and over-the-air broadcasting. See H.R. REP.
No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1992).
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ed the new must-carry rules."' The court expressed grave
disbelief at the FCC's assumption that consumers would need
five years to digest the essential message of the A/B switch and
consumer education rules-that a cable connection does not
preclude reception of over-the-air signals. 9
Thus, between 1984 and 1992, the FCC's only means for
retarding cable's corrosion of broadcast television's viewer base
were impotent rules requiring cable operators to offer subscrib-
ers an A/B switch and to inculcate subscribers on the virtues of
local broadcasting.2 An informal FCC survey showed just
how weak these rules were: thirty-one percent of broadcast
television stations reported that they had lost or been denied
carriage on at least one cable system.291 Others were "lost" in
a sea of cable channels when reassigned a cable channel number
not corresponding to the over-the-air frequency. For the
moment, cable was trouncing television in the monumental
battle for mass media dominion.
2. Give Me Carriage or Give Me Death
These developments set the stage for direct congressional
intervention. In 1984 and again in 1992, Congress enacted
statutes subjecting the cable industry to precisely the sort of
regulation that the FCC could not justify during the fifteen-year
Golden Age of Cable. The intricacies of local rate and entry
regulation of the cable industry have received extensive atten-
tion, most of it critical.292 Moreover, the Telecommunications
Act has consigned cable rate regulation to the waste incinerator
288. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292,304-05 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
289. Id. at 304.
290. Even these rules were legally suspect in the wake of the Century
Communications decision until the D.C. Circuit, at the FCC's request, confirmed
their vitality. See 4 F.C.C.R. 4552 (1989); see also 2 F.C.C.R. 3593 (1987)
(easing the rules in response to widespread complaints from cable operators).
291. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, MASS MEDIA BUREAU, CABLE
SYSTEM BROADCAST CARRIAGE SURVEY REPORT (1988).
292. See generally Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151,161-
205 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Donald J. Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., The Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: The Triumph of
Private over Public Interest, 44 ALA. L. REV. 355 (1993); David J. Saylor,
Programming Access and Other Competition Regulations of the New Cable
Television Law and the Primestar Decrees: A Guided Tour Through the Maze,
12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321 (1994).
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of legal history.29 For present purposes, it suffices to identify
two structural provisions, one each from the Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984 ("1984 Act")294 and the Cable Televi-
sion Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("1992
Act").295 Constitutional crisis befell the 1992 Act first. Whereas
the must-carry provisions of the 1992 Act explicitly protect
television as an older technology in eclipse, the cable-telco cross-
ownership provision of the 1984 Act came under attack only
when technological evolution brought the mass communications
market into direct conflict with the law.
Congress in 1992 finally imposed the must-carry obligations
with which the FCC had been flirting since Southwestern Cable.
Sections 4 and 5 of the 1992 Act subjected cable operators to
stringent rules that were arguably more onerous than the FCC's
ill-fated 1984 and 1986 "must-carry" regulations. The 1992 Act
effectively placed common carrier obligations on cable operators
vis-&-vis their broadcast television competitors. Under section
4, a cable operator must carry the signals of "local commercial
television stations"-that is, all full-power television broadcast-
ers besides "noncommercial educational" stations-within its
market.96 The Act required cable systems with more than
twelve active channels and more than 300 subscribers to set
aside as much as a third of their capacity for commercial
stations that request carriage.2 97 Cable systems with more
than 300 subscribers, but only twelve or fewer active channels,
must carry three commercial broadcast signals.2 98 In markets
that lack sufficient full-power broadcast stations to fill the
reserved channels, cable systems must carry either one or two
qualified low-power stations.299  Section 5 required cable
293. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 301(b), 110 Stat. at 114-15
(amending 47 U.S.C. § 543).
294. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended in scattered
portions of 47 U.S.C. (1994)).
295. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1994) (codified in scattered
portions of 47 U.S.C. (1994)).
296. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B), (h)(1)(A) (1994); see also 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3555(e)(3)(i) (1994) (defining a cable system's local television market); cf
47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(1)(C) (1994) (authorizing the FCC to redefine a cable system's
local television market upon the request of a broadcast television competitor).
297. See 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B) (1994).
298. Id. § 534(b)(1)(A).
299. Id. § 534(c)(1) (requiring a cable operator with as many as 35 channels
to carry one qualified low-power station and an operator with more than 35
channels to carry two low-power stations). Low-power television stations
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operators to carry "noncommercial educational television
stations"--that is, public television stations. 00 Depending on
system size, a cable operator must carry at least one such
station and might be required to carry every local public
broadcast station that requests carriage. °'
All signals covered by the must-carry rules must be
transmitted on a continuous, uninterrupted basis 2 and be
assigned the same channel as the carried station's over-the-air
frequency.303 Generally speaking, a cable operator may not
charge for requested carriage (although the operator may charge
carried commercial stations "the costs associated with delivering
a good quality signal or a baseband video signal to the principal
headend of the cable system"). °4 An operator need not "sub-
stantially duplicate" commercial or educational signals (including
signals from multiple affiliates of the same national television
network)305 but may credit such carriage toward its must-carry
obligations . 30
6
Between 1984 and 1994, all must-carry rules, whether
issued by the FCC or by Congress, languished in constitutional
limbo. Earlier decisions had never firmly settled cable's First
Amendment status.07 In one opportunity to examine the
broadcast over a limited area and are licensed on the condition that they do not
interfere with full-power stations' signals. Id. § 534(h)(2); 47 C.F.R. pt. 74
(1994).
300. 47 U.S.C. § 535(a) (1994); see also id. § 535(l)(1) (defining a
"nioncommercial educational television station" as one that is either (1)
licensed as a "noncommercial educational television broadcast station" and
therefore eligible for Corporation for Public Broadcasting grants or (2) owned
and operated by a local government for the "predominant[]" purpose of
transmitting "noncommercial programs").
301. A system with 12 or fewer stations must carry one public broadcasting
station. Id. § 535(b)(2)(A). A cable system with more than 12 but fewer than
37 channels must carry between one and three public broadcasting stations. Id.
§ 535(b)(3)(A). Larger systems must carry every local public broadcaster that
requests carriage. Id. § 535(b)(3)(D).
302. Id. § 535(b), (g)(1).
303. Id. §§ 534(b)(3), 535(g)(5).
304. Id. § 534(b)(10).
305. Id. §§ 534(b)(5), 535(b)(3)(B).
306. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(5) (1994).
307. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S.
488, 495-96 (1986). Compare Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981) (concluding that cable's "economic
monopoly" warrants a deferential "scarcity" approach to the constitutionality of
cable regulation), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982) and Berkshire Cablevision
v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 986 (D.R.I. 1983) (same), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d
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issue, the Supreme Court merely noted in passing that "[ciable
television partakes of some of the aspects of speech.., as do the
traditional enterprises of newspaper and book publishers, public
speakers, and pamphleteers.""'5 Simultaneously, the Court
compared cable to "wireless broadcasters," whose "First Amend-
ment interests" traditionally have been "found to be outweighed
by the government interests in regulating by reason of the
scarcity of available frequencies.""0 9 One point of agreement
did seem to emerge: the Court recognized the constitutional
significance of a cable operator's editorial discretion in selecting
and organizing programs.310  The renewed constitutional
controversy over "must-carry" at long last promised a clear
resolution.
The Court's answer, delivered in Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I,311 was disappointing."s The
Court did acknowledge, finally, that physical differences between
broadcast and cable media warranted a suspension of the
suspect "scarcity" rationale. 13 The Court nevertheless de-
clined to adopt strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of
382, 386 (1st Cir. 1985) with Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672
F. Supp. 1322, 1331 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (awarding full free speech rights to cable
operators). See generally Elizabeth A. Cowles, Note, Must-Carry and the
Continuing Search for a First Amendment Standard of Review for Cable
Regulation, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1248 (1989).
308. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494; see also id. at 496
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Different communications media are treated
differently for First Amendment purposes."); cf Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) ("Each method [of communication] tends to present its
own peculiar problems.").
309. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494-95.
310. See id. at 494; cf FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979)
(acknowledging that cablecasters exercise "a significant amount of editorial
discretion regarding what their programming will include").
311. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (plurality opinion) [hereinafter Turner 11.
312. Cf Bhagwat, supra note 73, at 159 (criticizing Turner for "fail[ing] to
articulate" a "clear theory of what constitutes content-based regulation" as an
"essential" element of "a coherent First Amendment doctrine").
313. Compare, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)
(upholding the FCC's "fairness doctrine") with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down an analytically indistinguishable
state statute requiring newspapers to offer a right of reply) and Riley v. Nat'l
Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (following Tornillo in striking
down a statute mandating certain disclosures in solicitations for charitable
donations). See also Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801
F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir.) ("[S]carcity is a universal fact."), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
919 (1987).
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review.314 Rejecting the cablecasters' argument that must-
carry obligations favor "broadcasters over cable programmers
based on the content of programming each group offers," the
Court described must-carry as a measure premised "on the belief
that the broadcast television industry is in economic peril due to
the physical characteristics of cable transmission and the
economic incentives facing the cable industry."1 ' The Court
adopted the intermediate standard of review ordinarily applied
to content-neutral regulation 16 and remanded for further
evidentiary development regarding the threat that suspension of
must-carry would pose to local broadcasters.317
In light of the expected and real impact of market structure
on the content of mass speech in general and on mass speakers'
programming mix in particular,1 ' it is hard to swallow the
Court's conclusion that Congress did not intend "to promote
speech of a favored content."1 9 The entire project of structur-
ing mass communications markets is premised on its ability to
alter the content of mass speech. Absent such an effect, laws
regulating the industrial organization of mass communications
risk being exposed as normatively unjustifiable jobs programs for
economically inept but politically powerful broadcasters.
By adopting intermediate scrutiny and remanding the case,
Thrner I virtually invited the court below to rubber-stamp the
must-carry policy. On remand, a deeply divided three-judge
district court 20 accepted that invitation and upheld the 1992
must-carry rules.3  Judge Stanley Sporkin's majority opinion
314. See Turner I, 114 S. Ct. at 2466.
315. Id. at 2467.
316. See id. at 2469; Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
317. See 114 S. Ct. at 2470-72; id. at 2475 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (disagreeing with the Court's application of
intermediate scrutiny but acquiescing"in the judgment vacating and remanding
for further proceedings"). For a thorough review of the fractured positions in
Turner I, see Marc Peritz, Comment, Turner Broadcasting v. FCC: A First
Amendment Challenge to Cable Television Must-Carry Rules, 3 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 715 (1994).
318. See, e.g., Spitzer, supra note 69, at 1382-84.
319. Turner I, 114 S. Ct. at 2461.
320. See 47 U.S.C. § 555(c)(1) (1994) (requiring any challenge to "the
constitutionality of [47 U.S.C. §§ 534,5351 or any provision thereof [to] be heard
by a district court of three judges convened pursuant to" 28 U.S.C. § 2284
(1994)).
321. See Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (Turner 11), 910 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C.
Dec. 12, 1995), prob. juris. noted, 116 S. Ct. 907 (1996).
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in Turner 11 emphasized the ability of the "increasingly horizon-
tally concentrated and vertically integrated" cable industry322
to inflict "financial harm and possible ruin" on broadcasters who
are denied cable carriage.3" 3 Turner 's observation that "rapid
advances in fiber optics and digital compression technology" may
soon eliminate any "practical limitation on the number of
speakers who may use the cable medium""2 became the basis
for Turner IIs conclusion that must-carry imposes no more than
a de minimis burden on cable operators. 5 Judge Sporkin
then summarily rejected five alternative measures that cable
industry plaintiffs offered in an effort to show the improper
tailoring of the must-carry remedy: restoration of the FCC's 1986
must-carry rules, private deployment of A/B switches, direct
governmental subsidies to economically distressed over-the-air
broadcasters, imposition of charges for carriage, and ad hoc
resort to antitrust remedies against cable operators.326
In dissent, Judge Stephen Williams disputed the existence
of a "threat to the continued viability of broadcast television,
either now in existence or looming on the horizon."327 In his
view, the government's "conclusory assertions" regarding the
economic injury suffered by broadcasters denied cable carriage
bore no relation to a coherent regulatory interest and in any
event had been met "with substantial contradictory evi-
dence."3" Judge Williams favored either of two less restrictive
alternatives to must-carry: greater use of A/B switches329 or
the adoption of rules requiring cable operators to offer nondis-
criminatory access, similar to "standard regulatory tools" used
"[in industry after industry" to ensure "accommodation of would-
be users of a bottleneck."33 ' Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson
cast the tiebreaking vote, siding with Judge Sporkin's decision
322. Id. at 740.
323. Id. at 743.
324. Turner I, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2457 (1994).
325. 910 F. Supp. at 746-47.
326. Id. at 747-49.
327. Id. at 755 (Williams, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 756.
329. Id. at 785-88.
330. Id. at 783-84 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n,
224 U.S. 383, 411-12 (1912) (railroads); United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp.
131, 227 (D.D.C. 1982) (local telephone exchange), af/d mem. sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983)); FERC Order No. 636, 57 Fed.
Reg. 13,267 (April 16, 1992) (interstate natural gas pipelines, codified at 18
C.F.R. at 284 (1995)).
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to grant summary judgment for the government despite his "own
inclination... [to] set this case for trial."33'
Thrner Irs temporary resolution of the must-carry contro-
versy destroys an important opportunity to reexamine the
factual and theoretical justifications for the structural regulation
of mass communications. Two of the three important interests
that Congress asserted in adopting must-carry rules--"promoting
the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity
of sources" and "promoting fair competition in the market for
television programming"332 -are demonstrably disserved by a
policy that equates content and viewpoint diversity with the
sheer number of programmers. This much is clear from a
critical look backward at the FCC's experience with comparative
licensing, broadcast ownership restrictions, and network
regulation. At the very least, Judge Williams's proposal to
require nondiscriminatory access to a cable system deserved
much closer consideration.3
The government's third regulatory interest, "preserving the
benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television,"334 all
but cries out for the subsidies that Judge Sporkin dismissed out
of hand in Thrner 1. 3 If local over-the-air broadcasts provide
essential services not supplied by other video programming, they
can be bought with a targeted fiscal appropriation. 36 As a
structural alternative to direct subsidies, must-carry is a blunt
and remarkably inaccurate instrument. Not every station
requesting mandatory carriage supplies valuable programming
that would evaporate in an unregulated market. Nor does
mandatory carriage guarantee survival for stations that receive
it. Finally, instead of drawing subsidies from a public treasury
funded (mostly) through progressive income taxes, must-carry
implicitly taxes one form of speech in order to finance anoth-
331. Id. at 752 (Jackson, J., concurring).
332. Turner I, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994); Turner II, 910 F. Supp. at 747;
see also S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 6, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 63 (1992).
333. Parts IV.D. & V.E., infra, explore this very issue.
334. Turner 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2469; Turner 11, 910 F. Supp. at 747.
335. See Turner II, 910 F. Supp. at 748-49.
336. Any economist could reduce this solution to four words: "Public goods?
Let's subsidize!" Jim Chen, The Constitutional Law Songbook, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY 263, 264 (1994).
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er.3" Every station requesting mandatory carriage eliminates
an alternative source of programming, thereby reducing the
freedom of cable operators and viewers alike in order to confer
an unknown measure of wealth on a local telecaster.
In this sense, the Turner litigation effectively reverses
American constitutional laws implicit preference for direct
wealth transfers over trade restraints.338 Ironically, merely
ten days before deciding Turner I, the Supreme Court issued
what may have been its strongest expression of this principle in
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,39 a decision overturning
a Massachusetts scheme to preserve its "local [dairy] industry by
protecting it from the rigors of interstate competition" and
enhancing in-state dairy prices through a "tariff ... borne
primarily by local consumers" rather than a tax-financed
subsidy.4' Among barriers to free trade, must-carry is argu-
ably more legally obnoxious than the protective tariff condemned
by the Dormant Commerce Clause; unlike judicial protection of
interstate commerce,341 judicial protection of free speech is
expressly commanded by the Constitution.
Having noted probable jurisdiction in Turner 11,342 the
Supreme Court will have a chance to revisit must-carry. Unless
the Court thoroughly rethinks its approach, the Turner litigation
will have accomplished little except proving again that structural
regulation of mass communications serves no purpose except to
protect incumbents on the verge of technological and economic
337. Cf Posner, supra note 51 (re-examining entry and rate regulation of
public utilities through the lens of public finance).
338. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the
Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47
VAND. L. REv. 1401, 1404-07 (1994) (discussing the extraordinary protection
normally provided to free trade).
339. 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
340. Id. at 2217; see also id. at 2214 n.15 (declining to "squarely confront[
the constitutionality of subsidies"); cf. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 278 (1988) (noting that "[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not
ordinarily run afoul" of the Dormant Commerce Clause).
341. See, e.g., West Lynn, 114 S. Ct. at 2219-20 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting the absence of textual support for the Supreme Court's
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence). See generally Farber & Hudec,
supra note 338, at 1407-11 (describing and deflecting challenges to the
legitimacy of Dormant Commerce Clause review).
342. See Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 907 (1996), noting prob.
juris. over 910 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1995).
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extinction. 43 Between Southwestern Cable and Turner I, cable
grew from a communications weakling, with low-capacity CATV
systems penetrating a mere nine percent of the viewership
market in 1970, to a twenty billion dollar giant whose multi-
channel cable systems had reached ninety percent of all
American households by the 1990s.34 Cable has become a
victim of its own success. Each level of regulation breeds the
next: Television broadcasters, once the primary subjects of FCC
regulation, eventually became the regulatory wards shielded by
the Cable Acts of 1984 and 1992. In due course, we may expect
the cablecasting industry to follow suit.
3. Mollycoddling Monopolists
Indeed, existing law already shelters cablecasting from some
forms of intermodal competition. For example, Congress's
refusal to exclude certain satellite master antenna television
(SMATV) facilities from the 1984 Act's private cable exemp-
tion345 grew out of a fear that SMATV systems serving sepa-
rately owned and managed buildings could undercut coaxial
cable services and thereby destabilize local cable franchising.
346
By repelling a challenge by SMATV operators to this provision
in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,347 the Supreme Court
swept yet another class of mass communicators into the 1984
Act's regulatory scheme. The new Telecommunications Act has
effectively overruled Beach Communications by extending the
private cable exemption to any facility "that serves subscribers
without using any public right of way."
34
For the moment, however, cable reigns supreme. SMATV's
minor legislative victory over Beach Communications scarcely
loosens cable's grip on the multichannel video programming
343. The same can be said for the agricultural protectionism at issue in West
Lynn. See Chen, supra note 20, at 872 (describing certain elements of
contemporary dairy policy as "a battle waged by economically endangered
entities against the rest of society"); Jim Chen, The Agroecological Opium of the
Masses, CHOICES, 4th Q. 1995, at 16, 19 (same).
344. See In re Telephone Co.-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 7
F.C.C.R. 5781, 5848 & n.352 (1992).
345. See 47 U.S.C. § 602(7)(B) (1994), amended by Telecommunications Act,
supra note 2, § 302(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 114.
346. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096,2103-04 & n.8
(1993).
347. 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993).
348. Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 302(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 114
(amending 47 U.S.C. § 602(7)(B)).
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distribution (MVPD) market. In September 1995, cable subscrip-
tion rolls boasted 61.7 million households, while all of cable's
MVPD competitors combined served only 5.8 million homes.
3 49
Traditional cable thus holds a ten to one edge over all other
MVPD providers put together, a technologically elite club that
includes SMATV, direct broadcast satellite, home satellite
dishes, and multichannel multipoint distribution service.
3 50
Another group of competitors, the Bell operating companies
poses a far more formidable threat to cable. In 1970, the FCC
prohibited telephone common carriers from "directly or indirect-
ly" engaging in the furnishing of CATV.35" The FCC justified
its rule on two grounds. First, telephone companies might deny
access or charge discriminatory fees for access to their utility
poles.3 2 Second, telephone companies might cross-subsidize
their cable ventures with telephone revenues. Although the
FCC's own staff expressed second thoughts, 54 Congress adopt-
ed a ban on "video programming" by telephone common carriers
as part of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.3"5
The 1984 Act thus excluded telephone companies from providing
the type of video programming that incumbent cablecasters
supplied in 1984.56
349. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for
the Delivery of Video Programming, FCC Order No. 95-491, 1995 WL 733714
(Dec. 11, 1995); see also id. appendix G, tab. 1. This document is the FCC's
second annual report to Congress on the status of competition in video
programming delivery market.
350. See id.
351. 47 C.F.R. § 64.601 (1970), as amended, 47 C.F.R. § 63.54 (1995).
352. See General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 856-57 (5th Cir.
1971) (noting that telephone companies "have a natural monopoly over the
means required to conduct a [cable] operation, i.e., the poles"), affg Applications
of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities
Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Sys., 21 F.C.C.2d 307
(1970).
353. See id.
354. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, FCC POLICY ON CABLE
OWNERSHIP: A STAFF REPORT 177-78 (1981) (speculating on the long-run
necessity for a rule barring telephone companies from cablecasting).
355. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 613, 98 Stat. 2779, 2785 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 533(b) (1994), repealed by Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 302(b)(1),
110 Stat. at 124); see H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1984)
(expressing congressional intent to prohibit "a common carrier from selecting
or providing the video programming to be offered over a cable system").
356. See In re Amendment of Parts 1, 63 & 76 of the Commission's Rules to
Implement the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 50
Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,644 (May 2, 1985) (interpreting the 1984 Cable Act's
definition of video programming to include "broadcast stations, superstations,
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In 1994 and 1995, no fewer than five lower federal courts
struck down the 1984 Cable Act's ban on "video programming"
by telephone companies as an unconstitutional infringement of
free speech. 57 But phone companies, however, had already
penetrated the mass communications market. Shortly after the
Bell breakup, telephone companies began to distinguish between
basic voice carriage and "enhanced" services.358 In 1993, the
Bell operating companies were given leave to offer interactive
information and data processing services.359 More significant-
ly, in 1992, the landmark Video Dialtone Order allowed tele-
phone companies to transport video programming selected and
provided by nonaffiliated companies.360
The Video Dialtone Order sharpened the legal and economic
issues raised by cable-telco cross-ownership. The Order limited
the range of interests that the federal government could
plausibly invoke in defense of the 1984 Act's cable-telco rule.
The government could no longer complain that telephone
companies might cross-subsidize their entry into and participa-
tion in the video transport business. The Video Dialtone Order
expressly permitted this activity. Rather, what the government
feared was "domination of the video programming market,"
accomplished by the leveraging of local exchange profits into the
fiercely competitive programming market.3 61 This regulatory
concern is indistinguishable from the objective underlying the
old finsyn rules before their invalidation in Schurz Communica-
tions and their subsequent repeal.362 If one equates "common
satellite-delivered cable networks and pay cable").
357. See cases cited supra note 11.
358. See Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198,
205 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
359. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1578-80 (D.C.
Cir.) (reviewing the removal of restrictions on the Bell operating companies'
entry into information services), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 487 (1993).
360. See In re Telephone Co.-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 7
F.C.C.R. 5781 (1992) ("Video Dialtone Order"), terminated by Telecommunica-
tions Act, supra note 2, § 302(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 124. See generally Robert L.
Pettit & Christopher J. McGuire, Video Dialtone: Reflections on Changing
Perspectives in Telecommunications Regulation, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 343
(1993).
361. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181,200 (4th
Cir. 1994) (emphasis added), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996).
362. See supra Part III.D.2. (discussing, inter alia, the invalidation of the
finsyn rules in Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir.
1992) (Posner, J.), and their ultimate repeal in Network Financial Interest &
Syndication Rules, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,907 (Sept. 21, 1995)).
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carrier" with broadcast "network," the difference between finsyn
and the cable-telco rule becomes thin indeed.
In retrospect, the federal government's most grievous error
lay in its failure to implement alternatives to a draconian ban on
telephone company provision of video programming. For
example, in its capacity as a common carrier regulator, the FCC
has extensive experience with antidiscriminatory cost-allocation
rules. 3 and price level regulation."' Both measures combat
cross-subsidization by natural monopolists capable of competing
in a diverse array of regulated and unregulated markets, 65 a
description that perfectly suits local telephone companies.
Before 1996's reform of communications law, the FCC agreed
that similar measures would be "adequate to forestall cross-
subsidy of the video programming activity."66 The courts and
the FCC noted one further alternative to an outright ban:
Congress might limit the number of cable channels on which a
telephone company could provide video programming and
require the telephone company to lease all other channels to
independent programmers on a nondiscriminatory basis.6 '
In repealing both the 1984 Cable Act's cable-telco rule and
363. See generally Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, 896 F.2d 1378, 1379-80
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (reviewing asset transfers between a regulated telephone
company and its nonregulated affiliate).
364. See generally National Rural Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 177-
81 (D.C. Cir. 1993); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 836 F.2d 1386, 1388-89
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
365. See JORDAN JAY HILLMAN & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, PRICE LEVEL
REGULATION FOR DIVERSIFIED PUBLIC UTILITIES 15-16 (1989) (discussing the
FCC's cost-allocation rules); id. at 64-65 (discussing the FCC's price level
regulation). A discussion of the actual operation and relative efficacy of these
regulatory devices lies well beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say
that these techniques lie at the heart of a heated debate.
366. In re Telephone Co.-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 10
F.C.C.R. 4617, 4637 (1995), terminated by Telecommunications Act, supra note
2, § 302(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 124; see also Reconsideration & Third Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC No. 94-269, IT 179-82 (Nov. 7, 1994) (detailing
the FCC's reasoning); cf California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the FCC had adequately explained how less radical alternatives
to an outright ban on ownership or participation could adequately prevent
telephone companies from improperly cross-subsidizing enhanced services with
profits from basic services); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572,
1580-81 (D.C. Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 487 (1993).
367. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181,
202 & n.34 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996); In re Telephone Co.-
Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules ("Video Dialtone Order"), 7 F.C.C.R.
5781 (1992) (same), terminated by Telecommunications Act, supra note 2,
§ 302(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 124.
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the Video Dialtone Order,36 the Telecommunications Act of
1996 has resolved this battle in favor of telephone company
entry. The Act contemplates four basic models of telco involve-
ment in cablecasting. First, a local telephone company may
"provid[e] video programming to subscribers using radio
communication,"369 in all likelihood some form of multipoint
distribution service.370 Second, as it could under the Video
Dialtone Order, a telephone company may provide "transmission
of video programming on a common carrier basis."37' Neither
of these models represents a substantial advance from pre-1996
law.
The Telecommunication Act's third and fourth models,
however, permit full-blown telco entry. A telephone company
not confining itself to video programming distributed via radio
frequencies or to mere common carriage will be regulated like
traditional wireline cablecasters.372 The key distinction lies
between telephone companies that are certified as "open video
systems" and those that are not. To secure open video system
certification, an operator must comply with special
antidiscrimination rules designed to curb self-preference and
cross-subsidization, including a rule limiting the "operator
... and its affiliates from selecting the video programming
services for carriage on more than one-third of the activated
channel capacity on [the] system" whenever "demand exceeds the
[system's] channel capacity."374
In exchange for compliance with these restrictions, open
video systems enjoy reduced regulatory burdens. In particular,
a certified open video system operator is freed from the Commu-
nication Act's rules limiting cable system channel capacity,
subjecting operators to local franchising, and restricting exit
368. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 124
(repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)); id. § 302 (b)(3), 110 Stat. at 1124 (terminating
FCC "regulations and policies with respect to video dialtone requirements
issued in CC Docket No. 87-266").
369. Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 302(a), 110 Stat. at 118
(adding 47 U.S.C. § 651(a)(1)).
370. For a discussion of this technology and its use by telephone companies,
see infra text accompanying notes 383-392.
371. Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 302(a), 110 Stat. at 118-19
(adding 47 U.S.C. § 651(a)(2)).
372. See id., 110 Stat. at 119 (adding 47 U.S.C. § 651(a)(3)).
373. See id., 110 Stat. at 121-23 (adding 47 U.S.C. § 653(a), (b)).
374. Id., 110 Stat. at 122 (adding 47 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1)(B)).
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from the cable business within the first three years of entry.37 5
On the other hand, the Telecommunications Act expressly
provides that open video systems must comply with the must-
carry obligations imposed by the 1992 Cable Act.
37 6
The Telecommunications Act does presumptively ban one
model of telco entry into cablecasting: the cable-telco merger. A
telephone company may not acquire "more than a 10 percent
financial interest, or any management interest, in any cable
operator providing cable service" in the same service area.
The reverse is also true; no cable operator may acquire a
comparable stake in a telephone company within its franchise
area.37 ' The Act also bans cable-telco joint ventures. 3 9  Ca-
ble-telco mergers and joint ventures are legal, inter alia, in rural
areas and in markets defined as "competitive" ones. 80
Although it is premature to forecast the success of these new
provisions, the Telecommunication Act offers video consumers
another weapon against entrenched cable system operators: in
nearly all communities served by cable, the coaxial octopus is
unchallenged.38 Now that the law has now unshackled cable's
most menacing rival, we may finally witness genuine competi-
tion in the video distribution market.
F. A TALE OF TWO AucTIONS 3 2
As 1995 ended and a battle-weary 104th Congress slumped
toward comprehensive communications law reform, a morality
play was unfolding. The first act involved multipoint distribu-
tion service (MDS), a cluster of thirteen microwave channels
often combined with excess capacity on instructional television
375. See id., 110 Stat. at 123 (adding 47 U.S.C. § 653(c)(1)(C)).
376. See id. (adding 47 U.S.C. § 653 (c)(1)(b)).
377. Id., 110 Stat. at 119 (adding 47 U.S.C. § 652(a)).
378. See id., (adding 47 U.S.C. § 652(b)).
379. See id., 110 Stat. at 119-20 (adding 47 U.S.C. § 652(c)).
380. See id., 110 Stat. at 120-21 (adding 47 U.S.C. § 652(d), which also
provides exceptions for small cable systems in nonurban areas and whenever
the FCC waives the general prohibition against cable-telco mergers and joint
ventures).
381. See Turner I, 910 F. Supp. 734, 740 n.10 (D.D.C. 1995) (reporting that
99 percent of all communities served by cable have only one cable provider),
prob.juris. noted, 116 S. Ct. 907 (1996); Thomas W. Hazlett, Predation in Local
Cable TV Markets, 40 ANTITRuST BuLL. 609, 611 (1995) ("[O]nly about 2% of
U.S. cable subscribers hav[e] a choice between firms.").
382. Cf. CHARLEs DICKENs, A TALE OF TWO CITIEs 1 (Buccaneer Books, Inc.
1987) (1859) ("It was the best of times, it was the worst of times ....").
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fixed service (ITFS) channels to provide "wireless cable."" 3
Although the need for "a line-of-sight path between the transmit-
ter or signal booster and the receiving antenna" imposes severe
technological limitations on wireless cable, this "heavily encum-
bered service" has nevertheless spawned "approximately 170
operating ... systems," "almost entirely in large and medium-
sized cities."8 4  Despite--or perhaps because of-MDS's low
channel capacity and inability to "reach over buildings or
mountains,"385 the law has raised few regulatory barriers to
entry into wireless cable. The 1992 Act and accompanying FCC
rules formally barred cable operators from owning or leasing an
MDS station within their franchise areas,"6 but Congress
provided for routine waivers of these rules.87 The Telecommu-
nications Act expressly permits cable operators "subject to
effective competition" to acquire MDS capabilities.88 Unen-
cumbered by legal barriers, telephone companies have also
plunged into wireless cable.38 9
383. See In re Amendment of Parts 1, 2, 21 & 43 of the Commission's Rules
to Provide for Licensing & Regulation of Common Carrier Radio Stations in the
Multipoint Distribution Serv., 45 F.C.C.2d 616, 616 (1974) [hereinafter
Amendments] (establishing two MDS channels in frequencies formerly used for
point-to-point rather than point-to-multipoint communications); Report & Order,
94 F.C.C.2d 1203, 1206 (1983) (reallocating eight of 28 ITFS channels for MDS
use and authorizing ITFS licensees to lease excess capacity to wireless cable
operators using MDS channels); Second Report & Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 6792 (1991)
(expanding further the number of channels available for wireless cable services).
384. See In re Amendment of Parts 21 & 74 of the Commission's Rules with
Regard to Filing Procedures in the Multipoint Distribution Service and in the
Instructional Television Fixed Service (MDS Report and Order), 10 F.C.C.R.
9589, 9593-94 (1995).
385. Bidding Starts for Wireless Cable Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1995, at
C4.
386. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(a)(2) (1994) (barring "a cable operator" from
"holdfing] a license for multichannel multipoint distribution service... in any
portion of the franchise area served by that cable operator's cable system"); 47
C.F.R. § 21.922 (1995) (same).
387. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(a)(2)(A) & (B) (1994) (ordering waivers of the ban
on cable-MDS cross-ownership in some circumstances and authorizing waivers
in other circumstances); Second Report & Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 6792, 6800 (1991)
(issuing a blanket waiver for joint cable-MDS operations and agreements in
place as of Feb. 8, 1990). See generally Amendments, supra note 383.
388. See Telecommunications Act, § 202(i), 110 Stat. at 112 (amending 47
U.S.C. § 533(a)).
389. See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the
Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, FCC Order No. 95-491, 1995
WL 733714 (Dec. 11, 1995) (observing that "three [local exchange companies
made] major investments in two wireless operators" in 1995).
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During the summer of 1995, the FCC laid down rules for an
MDS auction.390 By September the Commission formally
announced the auction. 9' On November 13, the FCC auc-
tioned MDS authorizations in 493 basic trading areas across the
United States. The first round's highest bid came in at
$188,750 392 --a trifling sum in the high-stakes world of commu-
nications. So ended the wireless cable auction, almost as quietly
as it began.
This morality play's second act presented a far different
story. Advanced television, a blanket term for "any television
technology that provides improved audio and video quality or
enhances the current NTSC television system,"393 became a
flashpoint that threatened the communications law reform in its
entirety. In 1987, the FCC declared that it would seek to
promote advanced television services that would enhance the
visual and aural clarity of broadcast television. 4 By 1990, the
Commission directed its advanced television efforts toward the
provision of "high definition television" (HDTV),395 which
"offers approximately twice the vertical and horizontal resolu-
tion" available under current technology-in other words, "a
picture quality approaching 35 millimeter film" and "sound
quality approaching that of a compact disc."3 96  Envisioning
advertiser-financed, over-the-air digital HDTV broadcasts, the
FCC declared in 1991 that it would limit eligibility for advanced
television licenses to parties who already had received or applied
for analog broadcast licenses as of that date.3 97  The
Commission's new-found authority to conduct spectrum auctions
warranted no reconsideration of this decision, for Congress
390. MDS Report & Order, 10 F.C.C.R. at 9589. The FCC's statutory
authorization to allow competitive bidding for licenses comes from 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(j) (1994). See generally supra text accompanying notes 110-114.
391. See FCC Announces Auction of Multipoint Distribution Service, 10
F.C.C.R. 10,729 (1995).
392. See Bidding Starts for Wireless Cable Rights, supra note 385 at C4.
393. Third Report & Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 6924, 6925 n.1 (1992). NTSC, the
acronym of the National Television System Committee, refers to the current,
analog television system based on the monochrome standard developed between
1940 and 1941 and the color standard developed between 1950 and 1953. See
In re Advanced Television Systems & Their Impact upon the Existing Television
Broadcast Serv., 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,540 n.3 (1995).
394. Notice of Inquiry in MM Docket No. 87-268, 2 F.C.C.R. 5125, 5127
(1987).
395. First Report & Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 5627 (1990).
396. Advanced Television Notice, 10 F.C.C.R. at 10,540 n.2.
397. Second Report & Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340 (1992).
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specifically limited competitive bidding to "principal use[s] of
[the] spectrum [that] will involve, or is reasonably likely to
involve, the licensee receiving compensation from subscrib-
ers."
398
Before the congressional debates over the Telecommunica-
tions Act began, the FCC had already determined the two most
important issues regarding advanced television. First, the
Commission had committed that one of the most valuable
remaining stretches of the electromagnetic spectrum would be
used to expand advertiser-financed television-what the FCC
extols as "[firee, over-the-air, universal broadcast television." 99
Second, the FCC had decided to give these frequencies free of
charge to incumbent broadcasters, who would use them during
a fifteen-year transition between analog and digital television
standards.00 At the end of that period, the Commission would
recover the old analog licenses and reallocate them.401  In
1995, the summer of the Disney/Capital Cities/ABC and
Westinghouse/CBS mergers, the FCC reaffirmed its decision to
give advanced television licenses to incumbent broadcasters.4 2
As it entered conference, the communications bill ratified
the FCC's advanced television policy. The Senate version
directed the Commission to allow future licensees "to make use
of the advanced television spectrum for the transmission of
ancillary or supplementary services if the licensees provide
without charge to the public at least one advanced television
"1403 Hoprogram service. The House version explicitly limited the
initial eligibility for [advanced television] licenses to persons that
[already] are licensed to operate a television broadcast station or
hold a permit to construct a station (or both)." °4
398. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(2) (1994); see also Advanced Television Notice, 10
F.C.C.R. at 10,545 (citing this limit on competitive bidding to justify adhering
to the FCC's original decision to limit eligibility for new advanced television
licenses to incumbent broadcasters).
399. Advanced Television Notice, 10 F.C.C.R. at 10,540.
400. See Third Report & Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 6924 (1992)
401. See id.
402. Advanced Television Notice, 10 F.C.C.R. at 10,541, 10,544-45.
403. Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, S. 652,
104th Cong., 1st Sess, § 206(a)(1)(A), 141 Cong. Rec. at 9964-65 (1995); see also
S. REP. No. 23, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1995) ("The broadcaster must provide
at least one free, over-the-air advanced television broadcast service on [the new]
spectrum.").
404. Communications Act of 1995, H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 301(a)(1), 141 Cong. Rec. 9954, 9995 (1995).
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The Telecommunications Act adopted the House's more
protective stance.40 ' The Act asks little in return of the incum-
bent broadcasters who will enjoy exclusive access to advanced
television frequencies. An advanced television licensee may be
asked to return as little as its original license to broadcast under
an electronic standard dating back to World II.406 Congress
left "to the Commission the determination of when such licenses
[should] be returned and how to reallocate returned spec-
trum."4 °7 These provisions represent an undiluted boondoggle
for incumbent broadcasters.
It was the least of auctions; it was the greatest of giveaways.
One of these two pieces of electromagnetic real estate is worth
between $25 million and $100 million; the other, perhaps as
much as $70 billion. One was auctioned as a routine matter; the
other has been given away free of charge to federal mass
communication laws oldest and most gently pampered wards.
It is a far, far better thing we do, than we have ever done, when
we sell access to the airwaves rather than sell out the public.
The $70 billion that the federal government will not net from an
advanced television auction would be enough to replace all 211
million television sets in the United States with brand new $330
models and to pay a $370 million bonus to the virtuous citizen
who proposed the idea.408  What price "free television"?
Thanks to this tale of two auctions, thanks to the contrast
between wireless cable and advanced television, we at last are
approaching a quantifiable answer.
405. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 201, 110 Stat. at 107-10
(adding 47 U.S.C. § 336); Conference Report, supra note 219, at 161, reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 173-74.
406. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 201, 110 Stat. at 108
(adding 47 U.S.C. § 336(c), which directs the FCC to "require that either the
[advanced television] license or the original license ... be surrendered" after
some period (emphases added)).
407. Conference Report, supra note 219, at 161, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N., 124, 173-74.
408. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 571 tbl. 897
(115th ed. 1995). Alternatively, if each television set in this buyout plan were
merely $30 cheaper, the federal government would net $6.7 billion, enough to
pay two-thirds of a typical year's on-budget agricultural price and income
supports or to give 250 million Americans a one-time tax rebate of roughly $27
per head.
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IV. THE COMMUNICATIONS PARADOX: A
REGULATORY POLICY AT WAR WITH ANTITRUST
A. ANTITRUST AS ANTIDOTE 409
The entire project has crumbled. In the six decades between
the Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Congress, the courts, and the Commission turned
virtually every premise of mass communications law on its head.
In defiance of elementary economics, the FCC has pursued
untenable policies favoring local ownership and hampering the
development of broadcast networks. Regulatory preoccupation
with the perceived limits of the broadcast spectrum has made a
mockery of the Commission's "public convenience, interest, or
necessity" mandate.410 More often than not, measures de-
signed to enhance program "diversity" actually suppress it.
Contrary to the Communications Act, mass communications law
routinely imposes common carrier obligations on broadcast-
ers41' and compromises licensees' statutory and constitutional
right to freedom from censorship.41 2 The preoccupation with
broadcaster identity as the exclusive means of ensuring program
diversity has warped the First Amendment precept that "[ilt is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount."4 3 Federal mass communi-
cations regulation has become a jobs program for favored broad-
casters, and those broadcasters' rights are, in practice, the only
entitlements that the courts and the Commission bother to
guard.
In sum, existing law does not "quickly allocate[] spectrum to
wireless technologies,. . .promote[] efficient resource allocation,
[or] minimize] government intrusion into electronic speech."41 4
Unless an intellectual revolution matches the technological
409. Cf ROBERT BORiK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (1978).
410. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303, 307(a), 309(a), 310(d) (1994).
411. See id. § 153(h) ("[A] person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not,
insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.").
412. See id. § 326 (prohibiting FCC censorship of radio and television
broadcasts).
413. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
414. Sidak, supra note 1, at 1213.
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revolution already afoot,4 15 the information superhighway will
collapse under protective legislation that preserves obsolete
investments at the expense of technological innovation. There
might not be a more debilitating attitude in a body of law
putatively dedicated to facilitating the exchange of novel ideas.
J. Gregory Sidak has proposed a large-scale reconception of
communications law according to "the antitrust laws' goal of
maximizing consumer welfare by promoting competition in the
markets for goods and services."416 Such a proposal is consis-
tent not only with the letter of the Communications Act,417 but
also its spirit. Sidak's call to action exposes the dreadful failure
of current mass communications policy to heed pertinent
analogies in antitrust law and the law of regulated industries.
The multiple failings of mass communications law can be
traced to an appalling neglect of antitrust principles. Although
one commentator has facetiously asked why cable can't be more
like broadcasting,4 8 the law in fact has assumed that broad-
casting is more like cable. The law treats broadcasting as
though it exhibits the monopolistic tendencies usually associated
with wired communications technologies. (Cable, after all, was
supposedly a natural monopoly.)419 Mass communications law
415. Cf Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the
Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1063 (1994) ("Rather than
resting upon ever-changing technologies to justify government regulation of the
electronic media, First Amendment analysis should strip away the technological
characteristics of the media.").
416. Sidak, supra note 1, at 1238.
417. See 47 U.S.C. § 313(a)-(b) (1994) (directing the FCC to revoke licenses
and refuse licensing to applicants found to have violated the antitrust laws with
respect to trade in "radio apparatus and devices"); id. § 314 (conforming the
FCC's licensing process to the "incipiency" model of trade regulation articulated
in the Clayton Act); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
222-24 (1943) (interpreting the FCC's obligations under 47 U.S.C. § 313); cf
United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 350-51 (1959) (holding that
§ 313 does not obligate the Justice Department to intervene in licensing
proceedings or to appeal the grant of a license whenever an applicant is
suspected of violating the antitrust laws).
418. Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends-Part I: Why Can't Cable
Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. REV. 212, 212 (1987).
419. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d
119, 125-26 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.); cf FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2096, 2104 (1993) (noting that the first SMATV operator to "gain[]
a foothold" in a cluster of buildings "could connect additional buildings for the
cost of a few feet of cable, whereas any competitor would have to recover the
cost of his own satellite headend facility"). But see Daniel L. Brenner, Was
Cable Television a Monopoly?, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 365, 410-11 (1990)
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repeatedly flouts the statutory command that "radio broadcast-
ing shall not.., be deemed a common carrier."4 ° The sun has
finally set on the ill-starred "fairness doctrine,"42' but the
Supreme Court has issued no clear statement regarding the
exact contours of a putative "right of access" for political
speakers.422 Far from collapsing, the public utility analogy in
mass communications law was reborn, phoenix-like, after its
apparent death in Sanders Brothers423 and has very effectively
reasserted itself. Indeed, one class of modern broadcasters
(cable operators) has been forced to submit to traditional public
utility regulation,42" and another (telephone common carriers)
has been banned from competing because it was presumably
impossible to regulate.425
"Trade restraints ... aimed at the destruction of competi-
tion[] tend to block the initiative which brings newcomers into
a field of business and to frustrate the free enterprise sys-
tem."426 Nothing is more frustrating than this simple conclu-
sion about today's mass media markets: The principal restraints
(suggesting that cable television was never the natural monopoly that its
regulators thought it to be); Hazlett, supra note 47, at 1370 (arguing that "the
existence of monopoly" in the cable television industry "is not by itself evidence
contradicting the consumer advantages of free competition").
420. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1994).
421. See, e.g., Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 660-61 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (holding that the fairness doctrine no longer serves the public
interest), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990); cf Telecommunications Research
& Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (declining to extend
the fairness doctrine to teletext service providers), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919
(1987). See generally Roland F.L. Hall, The Fairness Doctrine and the First
Amendment: Phoenix Rising, 45 MERCER L. REV. 705, 708-14 (1994); Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional
Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DuKE L.J. 151, 151-52 (calling for the
repeal of the "incoherent and unworkable" fairness doctrine).
422. Compare Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 132 (1973) (upholding a broadcast licensee's right to refuse political
advertisements) with CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 386 (1981) (upholding the
FCC's power to punish a licensee for failing to provide "reasonable access" to
candidates for federal office, as required by 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994)).
423. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); see supra text
accompanying notes 123-138 (discussing Sanders Brothers' embrace of a
competitive model of broadcast licensing).
424. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 541-547 (1994) (authorizing state and local govern-
ments to franchise, tax, and regulate cable rates).
425. See id. § 533(b)(1) (barring common carriers providing wire communica-
tions from the cable programming business), repealed by Telecommunications
Act, supra note 2, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 122.
426. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1945).
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of trade come not from the monopolists, but in the guise of
benign regulation authorized by the Communications Act of
1934.
In an intellectual setting devoid of antitrust reasoning,
structural regulation of federal mass communications law has
generated four basic fallacies. First, program diversity is and
should be equated with broadcaster identity. Second, the
broadcast spectrum is scarce, and that scarcity justifies harsh
regulation contrary to the ordinary rules of free enterprise and
free speech.427 Third, broadcast licensing at the level of scarci-
ty-that is, local distribution of mass speech-will be effective.
And finally, regulating every mass communications medium
according to the model of perfect competition will ensure efficient
distribution and diverse speech. Each of these propositions is
demonstrably false and deserves to be jettisoned.
B. ALL BROADCASTERS GREAT AND SMALL
Who shall broadcast? The fault may lie in the very posing
of this regulatory question, for "[t]he way a question is asked
limits and disposes the ways in which any answer to it-right or
wrong-may be given."42  Federal communications law has
focused on broadcaster identity, and that focus alone has given
rise to great mischief. Structural regulation of mass communica-
tions has failed because the law has become unduly obsessed
with broadcaster identity.
1. Communications Policy for a Nation of Shopkeepers
The longstanding regulatory tension between structural
regulation and presumptive reliance on competition corresponds
roughly with the "broadcast"42 s and "print"410 models of the
427. For a compelling argument that free enterprise and free speech are
identical phenomena despite legal academics' best efforts to insist otherwise, see
R. H. Coase, The Economies of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods and
the Market for Ideas, 64 AM1. ECON. REV. 384, 389 (1974), reprinted in RONALD
H. COASE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 64 (1994); cf E.G. West, The
Political Economy of American Public School Legislation, 10 J.L. & ECON. 101
(1967) (explaining why educators' views on public school legislation should
never be trusted).
428. SUSANNE K LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY: A STUDY IN THE
SYIIBOLISM OF REASON, RrrE, AND ART 3 (3d ed. 1967).
429. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)
(upholding the "fairness doctrine" as a means of ensuring "suitable access to
social, political, aesthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences").
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First Amendment.43 ' Whereas the "broadcast" model puts its
faith in command-and-control techniques and in structural
regulators' ability to choose the best communicator, the print
model shields private editorial privilege and entrusts the market
to discipline renegade editors. As implemented by the FCC, the
broadcast model assumes that the identity of the broadcaster
will dictate the nature of broadcast speech.
A vast amount of federal communications policy can be
traced to the misplaced belief that diversity in programming
necessarily follows deconcentration and broadened ownership.
There may be no other way to explain the FCC's historic
obsession with local ownership, minority ownership, and network
influence. The "small shopkeeper" theory underlying the
Robinson-Patman Act and other New Deal regulatory legislation
provides a useful point of comparison, 432 as do federal and
state-law statutes favoring family farm ownership. 3  Though
contrary to the principle that antitrust and allied fields of law
protect "competition, not competitors,"" the "shopkeeper"
approach counsels the protection of "diversity" through diffuse
ownership of broadcast facilities. Expression supposedly follows
ownership: Maintaining small firm size in a zero-sum market-
place ensures a greater number of entrepreneurs and, according-
ly, a wider range of expression.
If the antitrust laws serve as a boon for small businesses,
they do so for purely "distributive, rather than efficiency,
considerations;" the Congress that enacted the Sherman Act
intended "to assist small businesses as an end in itself, not as a
430. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(invalidating a state right-of-reply statute as applied to newspaper).
431. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 168, at 1721-24.
432. See generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE
FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991); Daniel J. Gifford,
The New Deal Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68
MINN. L. REv. 299 (1983); Daniel J. Gifford, Primary-Line Injury Under the
Robinson-Patman Act: The Development of Standards and the Erosion of
Enforcement, 64 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1979).
433. See generally Chen & Adams, supra note 21 (discussing the structural
regulation of specific markets); Chen, supra note 23, at 810-16, 875 n.353
(surveying legal preferences favoring farmers).
434. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis
in original); accord, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328,
338 (1990).
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means of increasing total economic output."43 5 Bitterly we may
regret how competition "driv[es] out of business the small
dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent therein,"
but such personal "misfortunes" are "the inevitable accompani-
ment of change and improvement." 416 In like fashion, structur-
al regulation of mass communications has dispersed managerial
jobs without improving the diversity or quality of broadcast
speech.
Indeed, treating mass communications as the domain of
shopkeepers has severely damaged First Amendment ideals. In
adopting the metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas,"437 much
of the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence confirms the
economic criticism of the "enhancement theory." "The concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment."438  Broadcast regulation,
however, favors the competitor-based view of speech over the
marketplace model. From the traditional practice of favoring
local broadcasters 439 to more recent controversies over ethnic
and gender preferences," 0 the FCC routinely assumes that
broadcaster identity dictates (or at least influences) program
selection. When viewed as obligations based primarily on size
or putative monopoly status, rules such as PTAR, finsyn, and
must-carry "begin[] to resemble more a penalty for a few of the
largest [speakers] than an attempt to favor struggling smaller
435. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern ofAntitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J.
67, 104 (1982), reprinted in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMiAN ACT,
supra note 432, at 71, 83.
436. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,323 (1897).
437. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct.
2510, 2518 (1995); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
438. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam). See generally
Jeffrey Blum, The Divisible FirstAmendment:A Critical FunctionalistApproach
to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273
(1983) (discussing the dichotomous structure of the First Amendment); L.
Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 SUP. CT. REV.
243 (arguing that the enhancement theory violates the First Amendment).
439. See, e.g., FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955);
NOLL ET AL., supra note 161, at 198-120 (comparing the localism policy with
FCC goals).
440. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-66 (1990)
(upholding distress sale and comparative licensing programs favoring minority-
owned broadcasting firms); Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 398 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (Thomas, Circuit Justice) (striking down similar programs favoring
female-owned firms).
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enterprises."44' At bottom, every policy favoring dispersed
ownership of broadcasting resources echoes the promise of
competition based on a variety of competitors. In a sea of puny,
anonymous mass communicators, no single voice can drown out
others seeking their own niches in a segmented speech mar-
ket.
442
Although virtually all of mass communications law has
grossly mismatched regulatory objectives and market reali-
ties, 443 has failed most spectacularly at its base: comparative
radio and television licensing. This failure stems from the FCC's
historical mismanagement of its "public convenience, interest,
and necessity" mandate. Its obsession with individual broadcast
licensees has blinded the Commission to the deep structures of
mass media markets. As a result, the FCC's stated commitment
to "diverse" programming within "scarce" media has belied the
Commission's systematic sacrifice of listener and viewer concerns
in favor of incumbent broadcasters' economic well-being.
The apparent obviousness of this economic analysis begs the
question that Donald McCloskey has posed of all seemingly self-
evident hypotheses: "If you're so smart why ain't you rich?" 4
If the network is "where it's at," why has the FCC-after the
fashion of a legally twisted Wee Willie Keeler-aimed communi-
cations law "where they ain't"?4 Part of the reason stems
441. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 592 (1983).
442. Cf Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (describing certain seditionists as "poor and puny anonymities").
443. Cf Stephen G. BreyerAnalyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less
Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547 (1979) (describing
mismatches between economic problems and legal tools as the greatest source
of regulatory failure).
444. DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, IF YOU'RE SO SMART: THE NARRATIVE OF
ECONOMIC EXPERTISE 111 (1990). But cf MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: A
PROVISIONAL TEXT 146-47 (rev. ed. 1962) (arguing that an academic economist
is unlikely to whip profit-driven managers into discovering and exploiting novel
business opportunities); Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70
MINN. L. REV. 917, 920 (1986) ("[Imf a brilliant theory is true, it should have
been discovered in the marketplace; because it has not been discovered-or else
it would not now be considered brilliant-it is very likely false.").
445. Wee Willie Keeler amassed an impressive batting average by hitting the
ball "where they ain't." GEOFFREY C. WARD, BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY 52 (1994); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 262 (1972) (principal
opinion of Blackmun, J.) (listing Keeler among the "many names... that have
sparked the diamond and its environs and have provided tinder for recaptured
thrills, for reminiscence and comparisons, and for conversation and anticipation
in-season and off-season").
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from familiarity. Because licensing centers on individual
stations, individual broadcasters dominate the regulatory stage.
Licensing is necessarily chummier than "an impersonal,
competitive market": "the regulator knows and inevitably feels
responsible for the firms he regulates." 6 Hence the ease with
which the law accommodates a "renewal expectancy" that
gravely offends every value held dear in classical economics.
2. The Road Warriors
Perhaps the focus on over-the-air broadcasting can be
justified after all. Television still matters."7 As goes televi-
sion, so goes every other mass communications industry. Even
as cable continues to drain viewers away from broadcast televi-
sion,4"8 media conglomerates up the bidding for traditional
over-the-air networks. In a single week in August 1995, larger
media giants wooed and won both ABC and CBS." 9 As a
practical matter, a very limited number of firms can amass
sufficient capital to acquire, organize, deliver, and promote the
constant stream of new programming needed to satisfy an easily
bored public. Notwithstanding the explosive growth in wireless
and wired communications technologies, much of that public is
still watching conventional television.
At the same time, concentration and consolidation are real.
The mid-1990s may be witnessing the second coming of the
merger and acquisition fever of the 1980s. 45 We may disagree
over whether to blame such concentration on the forces of an
"unregulated" market with tendencies toward "natural monopo-
ly" or the coercive presence of regulation.45' By virtually any
446. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 213 (1982).
447. See In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television
Broadcasting, 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, 3603 (1995) (statement of Ness, Comm'r) ("To
paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the demise of broadcast television proved
to be greatly exaggerated.").
448. See, e.g., Lawrie Mifflin, Cable TV Continues Its Steady Drain of
Network Viewers, N.Y. TAIES, Oct. 25, 1995, at B1.
449. See text accompanying supra notes 251-253.
450. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, This Year's Wave of Mergers Heads Toward
a Record, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at Al (noting "a feverish pace of global
business consolidation that during 1994 and 1995 could see as many companies
swallowed up as during the last three years of the 1980's, the decade of the
takeover").
451. Compare Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043,1046 (7th
Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (describing the "octopus-like" prospect that television
networks could leverage their position in program transmission into dominance
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empirical measure, however, we must concede that only a
handful of firms control the entire, highly lucrative market for
advertiser-financed broadcast television. So it is with every
other major mass communications medium: accelerating
technology, deepening capitalization, increasing concentration.
These are the ominous realities that lurk beneath the
soothing veneer of the Information Age. A technological
revolution is building the information superhighway that
promises to transform every facet of life. (To match the lilt and
swagger of the age, let's use a much catchier term, such as "I-
Way"452 or "infobahn."453) The empires built on newsprint in
the nineteenth century and on broadcast frequencies in the
twentieth surely will rise on electronically transmitted binary
digits in the twenty-first. The "observ[ation] that telecommuni-
cations technologies and media are converging" has become little
more than "a trivial ritual."454 What is seldom understood
(and even more rarely explained) is that the crucial entrance
ramps onto tomorrow's I-Way will rest in private hands, and
very few hands at that.
Technological change promises to exacerbate economic
concentration in the mass communications marketplace.
Although the networks that built radio's "empire of the air"
455
have yielded to today's diversified telecommunications giants,
the specter of scale remains. No less today than during the
golden age of radio, mass communications regulation races
"under the spur of a widespread fear that in the absence of
governmental control the public interest might be subordinated
to monopolistic domination."456 The fear is instinctive and
profound: She who controls the networks of the future shall
control the terms of speech. She who owns the superhighway
over all other aspects of broadcasting) with Fox Broadcasting, Inc., 5 F.C.C.R.
3211 (1990) (acknowledging that the FCC's restrictions on network structure
and activities may retard the formation of new television networks) and
Multiple Ownership of AM, FM & Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d
17 (1984) (making the same observation with regard to rules restricting
multiple ownership of licensed broadcast facilities, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1995)).
452. Paving the I-Way, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1995, at A14; I-Way Detours,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1995, at A10.
453. See Volokh, supra note 30, at 1806 & n.4 (attributing the coining of the
word infobahn to Lynn Levine of Warren Publishing).
454. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 168, at 1719.
455. See generally LEWIS S.W. LEWIS, THE EMPIRE OF THE AIR: THE MEN
WHO MADE RADIO (1st ed. 1991).
456. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
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shall fetch whatever toll she demands.45  I-Way robbery,
indeed.
Come the Apocalypse, only a very few combatants in the
mass communications marketplace will rule the infobahn. The
superhighway has arrived, and the final battles have begun.
Enter the Road Warriors. Superfirms such as television
networks, consortia of local broadcasters, multiple cable system
operators, local exchange companies, and interexchange carriers
all have begun to stake their claims in the increasingly competi-
tive mass communications industry.45  They are rich. They
are determined. They are merging. And most of all, they are
loud. The explosive range and versatility of communications
technology are creating a "cacophony of competing voices, none
of which [can] be clearly and predictably heard."459
Trying to restructure broadcasting according to the model of
perfect competition is neither possible nor desirable. Substantial
economies of scale in mass communications do exist, and they
preclude a market comprised entirely of atomistic, independent
actors. Moreover, there is no good reason to believe that a
monopolist would provide weaker, less diverse programming.
Indeed, economic theory suggests a contrary conclusion: A
monopolist would never duplicate programs and would therefore
increase program diversity.460 In a thoroughly accelerated and
impatient world, only dominant megafirms can tap productive
"advantages which, though not strictly unattainable" by smaller
firms, "are as a matter of fact secured only on the monopoly
level."46' Paradoxically, permitting the Road Warriors to run
roughshod over the information superhighway will improve the
flow of traffic.
457. Watch Tina Turner in MAD MAx II: BEYOND THuNDERDOmE (Warner
Bros. 1985) ("Break a deal, face the wheel.").
458. Cf Bhagwat, supra note 73, at 163 (describing the "primary players" in
today's mass media markets as "economic entities ... of very substantial size
and economic might").
459. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969) (footnote
omitted).
460. See, e.g., Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054-55
(7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) ("It has long been understood that monopoly in
broadcasting could actually promote rather than retard programming
diversity."); Steiner, supra note 191, at 194.
461. JOSEPH SCHUIPETER, CAPrALIsM, SociALisM, AND DEMOCRACY 101
(1942).
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3. You Sly Fox
To test the proposition that deregulation and any resulting
concentration actually will improve program diversity, we need
merely to reconsider the birth of Fox Broadcasting's "fourth"
network. In its brief life,462 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC468 stirred more passions over affirmative action46 4 than
that dreary debate deserves.465 Communications law expert
Matthew Spitzer has brought considerable talent to bear on the
question of whether race- and gender-conscious 4 66 licensing
actually increases the amount and quality of minority-oriented
programming.46  The answer, however, lies in Spitzer's almost
casual observation: "Increasing the [total] number of [broadcast-
ing] outlets reduces the cost to minority broadcasters of satisfy-
ing a taste for serving minority consumers. 4 s5 In other words,
increasing the aggregate amount of broadcasting by increasing
the number of "channels" available by air or by wire will
increase programming diversity even in the absence of race-
conscious measures.
Justice William Brennan's last opinion-and arguably one
of his most significant 469-- may have proved less effective than
the deregulatory strategy of reculer pour mieux sauter: "[r]etreat
462. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995)
(overruling Metro Broadcasting after the five-year reign of that case).
463. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
464. Compare Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts
of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107 (1990) (arguing that Metro Broadcasting
departed from prior cases and thereby destabilized the law) with Patricia
Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104
HARV. L. REV. 525 (1990) (defending Metro Broadcasting as an important step
toward full legal protection of multiculturalism).
465. See Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence," 36 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 147, 159 (1994) ("[W]e seem to have worn deep grooves repeating the
same basic arguments and counter arguments over and over."); Daniel A.
Farber, The Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893,912-
30 (1994) (documenting the decreasing relevance of affirmative action).
466. Gender-conscious broadcast licensing was not at issue in Metro
Broadcasting, but the D.C. Circuit rejected it shortly afterward. See Lamprecht
v. FCC, 958 F.2d 393, 393-98 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Thomas, Circuit Justice).
467. See Spitzer, supra note 64; see also Jeff Dubin & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Testing Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 841 (1995)
(presenting econometric evidence that increasing the number of minority-owned
broadcasting stations increases the amount of minority-owned programming).
468. Spitzer, supra note 64, at 327.
469. Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavy-
weight, 69 TEx. L. REV. 125, 128 (1990).
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in order better to advance." 7' Metro Broadcasting may have
been nothing more than the 1990's second most important legal
development affecting minority programming. Seven weeks
before the Supreme Court announced its affirmative action
decision, the FCC already had rendered a true landmark
decision in the field of minority programming. The
Commission's waiver of the finsyn and prime time access rules
allowed Rupert Murdoch-an Australian-born white man who
has had his share of trouble getting on the air471 -to paint
Fox's prime time schedule in living color.472 By the 1993-1994
television season, the "upstart fourth network" was airing five of
the ten programs most popular among black viewers.473
Fox's footsteps soon could be felt far beyond the realm of
minority-oriented programming. The new network snatched
from CBS the rights to National Football Conference telecasts
and proceeded to capture many former local CBS affiliates.474
The transmission sector that NBC portrayed as unregenerately
monopolistic suddenly became both competitive and diverse.
And a rollback of FCC rules on vertical integration had served
as the indispensable catalyst.
In a quirky way, the Fox parable shows that James
Madison's vision was good not just for the budding American
republic, but also for twentieth century media markets. Cast in
the best possible light, the FCC has opposed "faction" whenever
and wherever it might appear, vigilant against bands of
marauding speakers, "united and actuated by common impulse
of passion ... adverse to ... the permanent and aggregate
470. Fried, supra note 464, at 127 & n.118.
471. See, e.g., News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800,807-810 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Health & Medicine Policy Research Group v. FCC, 807 F.2d 1038,
1040 (D.C. Cir. 1986); cf. Daniel Peral & Elizabeth Jensen, FCC Studies Plan
to Force News Corp. to Reduce Control of Fox TV Stations, WALL ST. J., April
24, 1995, at A3 (reporting an FCC staff proposal to force Murdoch's News
Corporation to reduce its equity control of the eight television stations owned
by Fox Broadcasting Company).
472. See Fox Broadcasting Co., 5 F.C.C.R. 3211 (1990).
473. Paul Farhi, A Television Trend:Audiences in Black and White; Viewers
Split on Racial Lines as Networks Find Diversity Sells-But Critics See Cultural
Risks, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1994, at A20. See generally Chen & Gifford, supra
note 3, at 1338-45 (describing Fox's impact on minority programming).
474. See Bill Carter, Westinghouse Visits TV Land: Can It Put Juice into a
Lemon?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at C1 (reporting how competition from Fox
and a weak entertainment lineup has turned CBS into "a distressed property"
within "the exclusive network neighborhood").
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interests of the community" in open speech.4"5 Rightly fearful
of a regulatory design that would "giv[e] to every citizen the
same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests,"47
6
the Commission has treated content and viewpoint diversity as
the appropriate benchmark for regulating communications in the
public interest. The actual course of FCC regulation, however,
has extinguished the very "liberty" that gives rise both to
raucous "faction" and to vigorous broadcast speech.477
As in Madison's days, the proper solution lies in the creation
of a large expressive society.4 8 Just as a large republic accom-
modates multiple points of view without permitting the harmful
emergence of a dominant strain of rhetoric or political thought,
a large production, transmission, and distribution network
permits a greater diversity of mass speakers to express them-
selves. It took an extraordinary season of nation-building to
achieve Madison's republic. By contrast, the story of Fox
Broadcasting shows how a single refusal to regulate the market
structure of mass communications led to a parade of large,
fiercely competitive networks.
C. MAKING SCARCITY SCARCE
In statutory and constitutional cases involving radio and
television, the Supreme Court has assumed that the scarcity of
the broadcast spectrum justifies extraordinary restraint on free
speech. As the Court proclaimed in upholding the original
fairness doctrine: "Where there are substantially more individu-
als who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate,
it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak,
write, or publish."479 By the Court's own admission, this
distinction has given over-the-air broadcasters "the most limited
First Amendment protection.""' Warped by the scarcity
rationale, the free speech principles that "protect[] newspaper
publishers from being required to print the replies of those
whom they criticize" can be distorted into an apology for
475. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 54 (James Madison) (Edward Meade Earle
ed., 1937).
476. Id. at 55.
477. Id.
478. See id. at 60-61.
479. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
480. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
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requiring broadcasters to "give free time to the victims of their
criticism." 48' Despite wilting judicial482  and academic 43
criticism, and despite its own recognition that decisions made
under this assumption can hardly inform other species of free
speech jurisprudence,4s the Court has repeatedly refused to
overturn the scarcity rationale.8 5
The principal harm of "scarcity" analysis is legal myopia. Its
adherents inevitably stress the scarce nature of the specific
medium that the law happens to regulate. Fixated on the
obvious, bedazzled judges, legislators, and regulators overlook
far more significant structural issues. Whether a particular
medium is "scarce" in some abstract sense bears precious little
relation to the project of identifying the mass communications
market structure that maximizes overall consumer welfare.486
Every medium is scarce in the sense that some willing speakers
will lack the opportunity to speak. What matters far more than
scarcity is the total effect of all feasible methods for transporting
a particular piece of information from the speaker to a prospec-
tive audience.487
We can overcome our obsession with scarcity by consulting
481. Id. (contrasting Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
256 (1974) with Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390).
482. See, e.g., Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d
501, 508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (arguing that the scarcity rationale uses a
universal fact as a distinguishing principle), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
483. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 87-90 (1991); L.A.
SCOTT POwE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMiENDMENT 197-209
(1987); MATTHEW SPITZER, SEVEN DmTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES 7-18
(1986); Coase, supra note 113 at 12-27 (1959); Note, supra note 415, at 1072-74
(1994).
484. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) ("Our
decisions have recognized that the special interest of the Federal Government
in regulation of the broadcast media does not readily translate into a
justification for regulation of other means of communication.").
485. See, e.g., Turner I, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2457 (1994) (noting that fundamen-
tal technological differences between cable and broadcast media undermine
criticisms of scarcity analysis); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
376 n.11 (1984) (noting that the Court is reluctant to abandon the scarcity
rationale without congressional prompting).
486. See generally SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 193, at 411-47 (reviewing
empirical appraisals of the correlation between market structure and overall
economic performance).
487. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
400 (1956) (defining the relevant product market for antitrust purposes by
measuring or estimating the cross-elasticities of demand for all potential
substitutes for a particular product); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE &
FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, HORIzONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.1 (1992) (same).
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an indispensable element of antitrust analysis: defining the
relevant product market. This issue, so central to the battery of
antitrust doctrines hinging upon proof of market or monopoly
power,"' is persistently ignored by communications lawyers
who assume that a client's current technology represents the
sole product in question. 9 Measures of market dominance in
broadcast television mean nothing unless they account for the
erosive potential of cable, video rental, and other competitors for
consumers' scarce leisure time.49 This wisdom is implicit in
the distinction between a television program's "rating" and its
"share," and we ought not forget it even as more advanced
technologies shove broadcast television off the infobahn.
D. THE NETWORK AS BOULEVARD AND AS BOTTLENECK
1. Bridging Economics and Communications Regulation
The law's misguided obsession with "scarcity" has diverted
attention from the regulatory focus that is appropriate: networks
and their competitors. Broadcasting networks, conventional
cable systems, direct broadcast satellites, and the fiber-optic
telecommunications networks are all poised to provide the next
generation of home entertainment technology. No matter how
it is accomplished, mass communications depends on a"network"
in the sense of "a mixture of facilities and rules which allows
'primary' market competitors to exchange or share transactions,
physical traffic, energy, electronic impulses, or information."491
488. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12
(1984) (tying arrangements); Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36,44
(1977) (vertical nonprice restraints); United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,
415 U.S. 486, 496-97 (1974) (horizontal mergers); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1945) (concerted refusals to deal); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427-28 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.)
(monopolization). See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981).
489. Cf United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 453 (1964)
(treating metal and glass containers as practically interchangeable and their
manufacturers as effective competitors "even though some such uses have
traditionally been regarded as the exclusive domain of the competing industry").
490. See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 196, at 9 (estimating that American adults
spent 44.6% of their leisure time in 1990 on broadcast and cable television, with
network affiliates capturing 53.2% of this time, or 23.7% of all leisure time),
summarized in In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing
Television Broadcasting, 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, 3597 (1995).
491. Donald I. Baker, Compulsory Access to Network Joint Ventures Under
the Sherman Act: Rules or Roulette?, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 999, 1002.
1496
1996] CURTAINS ON COMMUNICATIONS LAW
There must be a centralized facility for gathering, organizing,
and transmitting audiovisual programs.
The network is the greatest achievement of the Road
Warriors. Indeed, it is their raison d'atre. A network, to be
sure, exhibits many of the traits of a natural monopoly.492 A
completed network permits the repeated transmission of
information at minimal marginal cost. Like the national electric
power grid or the natural gas pipeline system, a communications
network enjoys enormous economies of scale and network
externalities as each incremental expansion in audience size
increases the network's potential revenue from advertisers or
viewer fees. By permitting simultaneous voice, audiovisual, and
data transmission, a broadband network confers economies of
scope on its operator and enhances the value of all services
provided. It is no wonder that networks past, present, and
future have exhibited a strong tendency to integrate vertically;
accumulated capital enables them to absorb risks in program
production and to overcome high barriers to entry into program
distribution.
Modern mass communications thus reintroduced Harold
Hotelling's famous "bridge" conundrum in an age of expanding,
accelerating technology. How can we finance the massive initial
outlay to bridge a barrier without resorting to toll charges
exceeding the trivial marginal cost of each additional use?493
It does not matter whether the barrier is the Charles River or
the gap between a broadcast facility and its potential audience.
Public ownership is a theoretically plausible solution,494 but
492. See William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold
to Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 178-89 (1994) (formally describing the
monopolistic tendencies of a network within the framework of the "efficient
component-pricing rule").
493. See generally Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to
Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242
(1938). Cf. William S. Vickrey, Some Implications of Marginal Cost Pricing for
Public Utilities, 45 AM. ECON. REv. 605 (1955). Hotelling's bridge problem is
based on a celebrated Supreme Court controversy, see Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), which has inspired an impressive
and informative literature of its own. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860, at 130-39 (1977); Donald I.
Baker, Competition and Regulation: Charles River Bridge Recrossed, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 159, 165-77 (1975); Donald I. Baker, The Antitrust Division,
Department of Justice: The Role of Competition in Regulated Industries, 11 B.C.
INDUs. & CoM. L. REv. 571, 588-91 (1970).
494. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY
OF THE STATE (1969); OSKAR LANGE & FRED M. TAYLOR, ON THE ECONOMIC
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the periodic outbreak of legislative hostility toward the Corpora-
tion for Public Broadcasting testifies to the political impractica-
bility of nationalizing the infobahn.495
To remedy this shortcoming, we might consider antitrust
law's "essential facilities" doctrine and its applications in various
areas of economic regulation.496 In United States v. Terminal
Railroad Association,497 an awe-inspiring trust had acquired
exclusive control of a St. Louis facility connecting railroads east
of the Mississippi River with railroads to the west. As an
alternative to forced divestiture, the Supreme Court endorsed a
plan requiring equal access to the Terminal Association's
bottleneck facility. Although the essential facilities doctrine
meets substantial judicial hostility whenever it is couched as a
cure for all monopolistic ailments,4 98 it lies at the heart of the
recently completed "unbundling" of the natural gas transmission
market.499 It also animates the increasingly popular economic
theories embraced by the notion of "contestability." °° The
Telecommunications Act's "open video systems" model effectively
adopts this solution by permitting telephone companies to carry
video programming and relying on standard regulatory tools to
patrol any discrimination or cross-subsidization that may take
THEORY OF SOCIALISM (1938); A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1960).
495. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1994) (establishing the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting). Cf id. § 394 (establishing the National Endowment for
Children's Educational Television); id. §§ 391-393a (authorizing federal
appropriations for public telecommunications facilities).
496. For a cautionary introduction to this doctrine, see generally Phillip
Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990) (noting that the essential facilities doctrine invites
compulsory sharing).
497. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
498. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585, 611 n.44 (1985) (declining to endorse or reject the doctrine explicitly);
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979)
(declining to order an inventor of new color film to disclose information on the
film for the benefit of firms that competed against the inventor for film
developing business), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); cf Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring) (suggesting the
applicability of the essential facilities doctrine in an antitrust dispute involving
print journalism).
499. See 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267, 13,268-77 (April 16, 1992) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 284 (1994)).
500. See generally Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation
and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111 (1984); Elizabeth
E. Bailey, Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy, 71
AM. ECON. REV. 178 (1981).
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place.5"' Nondiscriminatory access likewise holds the key to
the continuing Turner litigation; neutral access rules offer a less
restrictive alternative to draconian must-carry obligations. °2
2. Withering Heights
The FCC has similarly misregulated vertical integration in
mass media. Like the failed localism initiative, the FCC's efforts
to patrol multiple ownership of broadcast facilities floundered
because of the Commission's reluctance to acknowledge enor-
mous economies of scale and scope. Half a century ago, the
FCC's successful war against NBC 3 proved for all time that
the true locus of economic power in mass communications lay in
the network, the intangible but essential transmission facility in
a commercial marketplace of ideas. As if willfully blind, the
FCC launched ill-starred attacks on network participation in
program production and local program selection. From the
cesarean section that yielded ABC5" to the induced birth of
Fox Broadcasting," 5 the FCC has served as a clumsy midwife
to the mothers of inventive entertainment.
Oversimplified, the rationale for regulation of transmission
targeted that sector's monopolistic tendencies: after amassing
the large initial capital outlay needed to launch a new network,
an entrant may experience increasing returns on scale and
constantly declining marginal costs of production over the
relevant range of output. Similar barriers to perfect competition
have always plagued book and newspaper publishing. Fear of
monopoly loomed even larger with innovations facilitating the
farflung, nearly instantaneous exchange of information. The
Communications Act of 193456 accordingly subjects wire
carriers-that are compared to pipeline companies-to certifi-
501. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 302(a), 110 Stat. at 121-24
(adding 47 U.S.C. § 653).
502. See Turner I, 910 F. Supp., 734, 783-84 (D.D.C. 1995) (Williams, J.
dissenting), prob. juris. noted, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996).
503. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224
(1943) (upholding the FCC regulations against abuses by broadcast networks);
supra text accompanying notes 200-221 (discussing the FCC's offensive against
vertical integration and coordination in mass communications).
504. See supra text accompanying notes 164-183 (discussing the failed
localism initiative).
505. See Fox Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 5 F.C.C.R. 3211, 3211-14 (1990)
(granting Fox's request for a waiver of the definition of "network" for the
purposes of applying finsyn and PTAR).
506. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-612 (1994).
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cates of "public convenience and necessity" °7 and to FCC
review of "just and reasonable" charges."' By contrast, the
FCC licenses local radio and television broadcasters-the local
distributors of this industry-according to a rationale that
sounds of land-use or zoning law. The Act does provides
expressly that "radio broadcasting shall not ... be deemed a
common carrier.""' Because the electromagnetic spectrum is
far too narrow to accommodate all who would use it, the federal
government allocates speech rights according to a "public
interest" standard premised on the incurable scarcity spec-
trum.5"' Wherewith the tautology of mass communications
regulation: we regulate broadcast speech because a spectrum is
scare, and broadcast diversity is scare because we regulate
speech.
As with natural gas, so with mass communications. The
deregulation of the natural gas industry suggests a possible
solution to the communications paradox.51' Like most miracu-
lous visions, however, this solution lies beyond the senses until
the would-be beholder undergoes a thorough reassessment of
beliefs and a complete rebirth of faith.
E. THE NEW COMPETITION: IMPERFECT AND INTERMODAL
Miss MOSEY. Nobody wants to come to shows no more. Get baseball in
the summer, television all the time ....
DUANE: Won't be much to do in town when the picture show close ....
- The Last Picture Show (1971)612
So inspired, we can begin to see the contours of certain
truths about communications regulation. Economic and social
progress depends on laws that protect "competition, not competi-
tors.""1 The countless voices crowding the mass communica-
507. Id. § 214(a).
508. Id. § 201(b); cf 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1994) (regulating the interstate
transportation of natural gas according to a "public convenience and necessity"
standard and mandating 'just and reasonable" rates).
509. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1994)
510. See id. §§ 301, 303, 307(a), 309(a), 310(d).
511. See Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-60,
103 Stat. 157; Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead
Decontrol, FERC Order No. 636, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (April 16, 1992) (restruc-
turing regulations to encourage a competitive unbundled gas market (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284 (1995)).
512. Hear Jessie Lee Fulton & Jeff Bridges in THE LAST PICTURE SHOW,
supra note *.
513. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
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tions markets are hardly a menacing "cacophony."514 Rather,
they represent the birth cries of an information revolution. In
all facets of a society built on speech and the free exchange of
ideas, "verbal cacophony is ... not a sign of weakness but of
strength."515  In mass media's apocalyptic future, nothing
silences the beautiful, cacophonous clatter of competition like
regulatory barriers to entry.
The economic realities of mass media and mass marketing
have exposed the fundamental error underlying both federal
mass communications law and traditional free speech jurispru-
dence. As the most lucrative segment of the marketplace of
ideas, mass communications proves as nothing else can "that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market."516 The market-
place metaphor serves as the rallying cry for "the most impor-
tant surviving strand of a general plea for laissez-faire and
limited government."1 7 In touting this metaphor, both the
Supreme Court 1 8 and libertarian commentators 519 implicitly
assume that the marketplace consists of numerous, small
enterprises, each too small to affect the overall social fabric of
speech through unilateral action. Ironically, so do the "new
speech regulators" who express no confidence "in the invisible
hand [of] 'the marketplace of ideas.' 52 ° Like most of their
libertarian antagonists, left-of-center crusaders against pornog-
raphy and hate speech"' presume that freedom of speech flows
514. Cf Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2528 (1994)
("The First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility
undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests.").
515. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
516. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
517. Bhagwat, supra note 73, at 174; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free
Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 952 (1995) ("Those who
would deregulate both speech and economic markets distrust government
equally in both spheres.").
518. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 115 S. Ct. 2510,2518 (1995);
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,55-56 (1988); Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
519. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 427; Aaron Director, The Parity of the
Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1964); Richard A. Epstein, Property,
Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 70 (1992).
520. Sullivan, supra note 517, at 954.
521. See generally, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); MARI
J. MATsuDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTiVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); Richard Delgado, Campus
Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343
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from a marketplace populated by numerous, small speakers.
One side hails the puny pamphleteer; the other denounced the
spirit-killing classroom heckler. The only difference is that the
new speech regulators allege catastrophic market failure and
prescribe the specific remedy of secure speech markets for the
victims of rampant sexism and racism.
In short, virtually all of us, regardless of political predilec-
tion, have placed the "street corner speaker"522 of such classic
as Schenck v. United States,523 Abrams v. United States,24
and Gitlow v. New York525 at the center of the speech market-
place. This image of diverse speech through diverse speakers is
consistent with the market structure prescribed by perfect
competition: numerous small firms freely entering and exiting a
market through cost-cutting and price competition.52 In the
world of mass media, however, the real players are a far cry
from the "poor and puny anonymities" of the First Amendment's
marketplace of ideas.52 Thanks to natural entry barriers and
the economics of mass marketing, the channels for electronic
speech are few indeed and likely to remain in the hands of the
Road Warriors.52 Nor do (or should) mass speakers deliver
products even remotely comparable to those generated by perfect
competitors, which are "perfectly homogeneous in the sense that
no buyer distinguishes between the products of any two suppli-
ers."
529
To the extent that the law has decided who shall broadcast
by reference to the model of perfect competition, it has failed.
First Amendment doctrine and mass communications regulation
have indulged a preference for shopkeepers at the expense of
most speakers and consumers of the mass media. We must
acknowledge the inevitability of imperfect and intermodal
competition in mass communications. The only sensible solution
(1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431.
522. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405,
1408 (1986).
523. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
524. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
525. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
526. SCHERER & Ross, supra note 193, at 15-18.
527. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
528. Cf Bhagwat, supra note 312, at 174 ("Speakers are not numerous, nor
are they fimgible . .. ").
529. Bailey & Baumol, supra note 500, at 113.
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is to permit open warfare within the small but formidable club
of Road Warriors. Further regulatory resistance is probably
harmful and surely futile. "We must not forget that regulatory
measures are temporary expedients, not eternal verities-if
indeed they are verities at all."530 Confronted with a record of
regulatory failure, we should do what the United States Army
should have done long ago in Vietnam: declare victory and
leave.53' What we need in mass communications law is unilat-
eral disarmament, conducted with enough aplomb to permit the
regulatory state a graceful surrender.
The traditional distinction between broadcasting and
telephony-a distinction rooted in technology,532 reinforced by
economics and regulation, 33 and codified in law53 4-has prac-
tically disappeared. But one constant remains: the deep
structure of competition endures despite radical technological
transformations. Once we understand the true nature of mass
communications, many longstanding legal myths wither away.
Contrary to judicial portrayals of broadcasting as an industry
that consumes exceedingly scarce spectrum while delivering
alarmingly nondiverse programming, FCC-regulated program-
530. FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 489 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
531. See WILLIAMi N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 21 n.20 (2d ed. 1995)
(attributing this statement to Senator George Aiken (R-Vt.) and describing the
statement as "advice that seems unimpeachable in retrospect").
532. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 31 (1983)
(observing that technological limitations historically determined the uses of
radio and wire technology).
533. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 14, § 1.3.4, at 17-20 (describing the
related but eventually separate trails by which AT&T came to dominate
telephony and RCA came to dominate broadcasting). Compare United States
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 1 DECREES AND JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL FEDERAL
ANTITRUST CASES 483, 485 (D. Or. 1914) (reprinting an early consent decree in
which AT&T agreed to stop acquiring competing independent telephone
companies) with National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943) (affirming FCC regulations that prompted NBC, an RCA subsidiary, to
divest what eventually became the American Broadcasting Company).
534. Compare 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-228 (1994) (regulating telephone companies
as common carriers) with 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399b (1994) (regulating broadcasters
and other users of frequencies for wireless communications). Compare also FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (justifying the suppression of
George Carlin's "seven filthy words" soliloquy-because broadcast radio has a
"uniquely pervasive presence" in homes with children) with Sable Communica-
tions, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124-27 (1989) (requiring the FCC to justify its
dial-a-porn restrictions as the "least restrictive means" available because
telephone audiotext services are not a "uniquely pervasive" medium).
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mers supply merely one stream of information and entertain-
ment in a broader market notable for an abundance of outlets
and a stunning diversity of viewpoints.
Over-the-air television faces stiff competition from new
technologies. Ever since community antenna television fired its
opening volley against broadcast television,535 cablecasting and
over-the-air broadcasting have waged a legal war that has
brutally scarred First Amendment jurisprudence. Far from
ending peaceably, the epic struggle between the technological
brainchild of the 1940s and the electronic upstart of the 1960s
culminated in the 1984r 6 and 1992 Cable Acts.531 7 The Su-
preme Court's 1994 attempt to resolve the must-carry controver-
sy538 failed to stem a judicial attack on the last legal barrier to
the telephone companies' full-scale entry into mass communica-
tions.539 Now the Court must revisit must-carry, mere months
after Congress heralded the new age of phone company involve-
ment in video programming and distribution.
But even natural monopolies are not entirely immune from
the disciplining effects of competition. Even as Supreme Court
was pondering cable's regulatory fate in 1968,540 Harold
Demsetz recognized that "there is no clear or necessary reason
for production scale economies to decrease the number of bid-
ders."54' Many would-be providers can offer to deliver a good
or service; MCIs legendary and successful effort to loosen
AT&T's grip on the long-distance telephone market illustrates
how even an underfunded upstart can rattle the most en-
535. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968);
supra text accompanying notes 260-270 (discussing opening round in the
regulatory struggle between television broadcasting and cable broadcasting).
536. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat.
2779 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1994) and other scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.(1994)).
537. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered portions 47 U.S.C.
(1994)).
538. See TurnerI, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2451-73 (1994) (applying an intermediate
level of scrutiny in testing the constitutionality of "must-carry" provisions).
539. See cases cited supra note 357.
540. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167-81
(1968) (recognizing the FCC's authority under the Communications Act of 1934
to regulate CATV systems).
541. Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 57 (1968)
(emphasis in original).
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trenched of incumbent monopolists.542 Absent collusion be-
tween monopolists and potential entrants, and absent prohibitive
negotiation costs, potential buyers can pick among multiple
providers.5" Even during the ascendancy of strict entry and
price regulation of the natural gas market by the old Federal
Power Commission, large retail purchasers of natural gas could
spur geographic competition by accepting service bids from
different pipelines.5 More recently, industrial gas consumers
have successfully "bypassed" local distribution companies that
(with the complicity of redistribution-minded state regulators)
had previously staggered retail gas rates to subsidize residential
consumers.
545
In the mass communications context, Demsetz competition
may take place either by regulatory fiat or by consumer choice.
As an alternative to franchising cable operators, municipalities
may simply allow competing cablecasters to bid for subscrib-
ers.5 46 Most mass media consumers are already free to choose
542. See Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953, 953-67 (1969)
(granting MCI's application for construction permits to establish new microwave
radio communication facilities in the Midwest); see also MCI Telecommunica-
tions Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 367-80 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (allowing MCIs
Execunet telephone service to compete against AT&T), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1040 (1978); Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1145
(9th Cir.) (opening the door for new specialized common carriers to compete
with established carriers), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
543. See Demsetz, supra note 67, at 57.
544. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651,652-62
(1964) (blocking a frustrated pipeline's effort to acquire a pesky, smaller
competitor that had underbid the acquiring pipeline in serving the lucrative
California gas market).
545. See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. FERC, 955 F.2d 1412, 1414-15
(10th Cir. 1992) (reviewing FERC's decision to authorize an industrial consumer
to purchase gas directly from an interstate pipeline); Michigan Consol. Gas Co.
v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 887 F.2d 1295, 1296-99 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1079 (1990); cf Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Energy Regulatory
Admin., 889 F.2d 1110, 1110-13 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (approving the importation of
25 billion cubic feet of gas from Canada to replace costlier gas previously
supplied by a local distribution company). See generally Martin V. Kirkwood,
Comment, Distributor Bypass in the Deregulated Natural Gas Industry-Are
Consumers Being Left in the Cold?, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1157, 1181-85 (1990);
Note, Preemption and Regulatory Efficiency in Federal Energy Statutes, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1306, 1314-17 (1990).
546. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable Television:
Implications for Public Policy, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 66 (1990) (favoring greater
competition in local cable markets); Oliver Williamson, Franchise Bidding for
Natural Monopolies-In General and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. EcON. &
MGMT. SCI. 73 (1976).
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among three "natural" monopolists for their primary supply of
audiovisual home entertainment: broadcast television, cable
television, and direct broadcast satellite services. Any couch
potato armed with a universal remote control instinctively
understands what the Supreme Court has confessed: "cable and
satellite television" are effectively interchangeable media, since
the "mixture of news, information, and entertainment" provided
by cable television does not differ "systematically in its message
from that communicated by satellite broadcast program-
ring."547 The corrosive effect of intermodal competition seri-
ously constrains the market power of even the seemingly
invincible, locally franchised cable operator.
The failure to recognize the Road Warriors as intermodal
competitors is even more debilitating than the scarcity fallacy.
Demsetz competition between Road Warriors wielding different
technology keeps all potential monopolists at bay; the consumer's
ability to choose among competing forms of mass media under-
mines any one technology's ability to monopolize the market. As
befits a legal regime whose most celebrated adventure was the
creation and eventual dismemberment of the Bell System,54
federal communications law has repeatedly mismanaged the task
of taming monopoly. Though fear of monopoly has theoretically
justified the legal command to set "just and reasonable" charges
for wire or radio communications performed by common car-
riers, 549 Congress and the FCC historically preferred coddling
Ma Bell over commending the myriad competitors who sought to
erode AT&T's monopoly power. Nothing shakes the cathedral of
federal mass communications law like a "cacophony of competing
voices,"550 the cackle of upstarts who reject the Communications
Act's faith in overly structured competition. The "great fear"
that now grips the law on the eve of the technological revolution
547. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 449 (1991); see also Medlock v.
Pledger, S.W.2d 202,204 (1990) (finding cable television and satellite broadcast
services to be "substantially the same"), aff/d in part and rev'd in part sub nom.
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
548. Compare United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131,
226-27 (D.D.C. 1982) (Bell divestiture decree), affd mem. sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) with Telecommunications Act, supra note
2, §§ 101-151, 601, 110 Stat. at 61-107, 143-44 (new provisions on competition
in local and long-distance telephony).
549. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
550. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); accord
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980).
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in communications is "a fear not of one but of many."551
A sensible antitrust-style approach to mass communications
law thus prescribes a general attitude favoring deregulation.5 52
We should permit all entrants to offer any service to any willing
buyer, regardless of the entrant's regulated status or competitive
prowess, whether realized or merely feared. The size of each
competitor is no concern; the number of competitors matters
even less. So long as freedom of entry and freedom of exit shall
reign, the mass communications market will continue informing,
educating, and entertaining the world. The only genuine
regulatory concern that remains is fear of discrimination. In
patrolling self-dealing by the owners of tomorrow's essential
communications facilities, regulators addicted to the public
utility model should heed the lessons of First Amendment
jurisprudence and choose the least restrictive alternative
available for minimizing potential discrimination.553
V. THE CLARION CALL
Just when Congress and the courts thought that it was safe
to regulate the nascent cablecasting monopoly, video program-
mers discovered that the existing network of telephone connec-
tions offered an alternative avenue into America's living rooms.
The evolution of the network should be familiar by now. What
began as the Union Pacific Railway between Sacramento and
Omaha554 became the railroad system and eventually the
interstate highway system; the point-to-point mail delivery
system became the second-class mass marketing machine;
Guglielmo Marconi's wireless telegraph yielded eventually to
551. T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 19 (1935).
552. See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 193, at 37 (describing a "third-best"
regulatory approach of "choos[ing] among alternative general policies, trying to
adopt the policy that on average has the most favorable resource allocation
implications" (emphasis in original)); Chen & Adams, supra note 20 (urging the
adoption of such "third-best" approaches in all laws affecting market structure
and industrial organization).
553. See, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
("The Government may ... regulate the content of constitutionally protected
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least
restrictive means to further the articulated interest."); cf Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (requiring a state that burdens religiously
motivated practices to show that its chosen legal tool "is the least restrictive
means of achieving some compelling state interest"). But see Board of Trustees
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
554. See Pacific Railway Act, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489, 490 (1962).
1507
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1415
broadcast radio's empire of the air.555 Now the independent
Bell operating companies have fought to enter the mass
communications market on two fronts. This final form of
intermodal competition threatens to reshape the mass media
markets in the image of the original communications monopoly,
the Bell system.
At the moment, the Bell operating companies control most
of the local and the short-haul telecommunications business in
the United States. Unlike cable television, which can do no
more than transport data from a central source downstream to
subscribers, local exchanges are switched systems and can
connect any subscriber on the network to any other. 56 The
capacity to call anyone else who has a telephone implies the
capacity to communicate interactively with the originator of data
or video programming delivered within a local exchange. The
gradual deployment of high-capacity optic fiber promises to give
the titans of telephony a momentary technological edge over
coaxial cable systems.
The heart of the old Bell System-Ma Bell itself, the
recently rechristened and restructured AT&T, Inc.-stands
poised to launch yet another offensive in the mass media wars:
wireless services delivered through McCaw Communications. 557
Might this merger foreshadow the birth of new communications
empires, spanning both traditional telephony and wireless
networks as yet unforeseen?58 In a span of days during
January 1996, three of the biggest Road Warriors emphatically
answered "yes": as AT&T announced plans to enter the satellite
555. See EDWARD A. DOERING, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BROADCASTING VERSUS
FREEDOM OF THE AIR 4 (1939) (noting how Marconi thought of radio as a ship-
to-shore messaging system and patented his invention accordingly as a "wireless
telegraph").
556. See In re Telephone Co.-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 7
F.C.C.R. 5781, 5821 (1992) (identifying interactivity as the key distinction
between "one-way" cable television and video dialtone), terminated by
Telecommunications Act, supra note 2, § 302(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 124.
557. See Craig 0. McCaw & American Tel. & Tel. Co., 9 F.C.C.R. 5836, 5839
(1994) (approving the McCaw-AT&T merger), affd sub noma. SBC Communica-
tions, Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1995); cf In re Craig 0. McCaw &
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.C.C.R. 11,786 (1995) (refusing to reconsider the
FCC's approval of the McCaw-AT&T merger). See generally SBC Communica-
tions, 56 F.3d at 1488-90 (tracing the regulatory and judicial proceedings
accompanying this merger); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 46 F.3d 1198,
1201-02 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same).
558. See Sidak, supra note 1, at 1224.
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broadcasting business by acquiring DirecTV,"' MCI and
Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation won "a brief but spirited
bidding war ... for the [FCC's] last unclaimed orbital slot"
designated for direct satellite broadcasts.56 In search of
comparable opportunities to expand old lines of business and
conquer new ones, the interexchange carriers, the regional Bell
operating companies, and cable conglomerates are all scrambling
to acquire or be acquired in a frenzy of activity reminiscent of
the mergers-and-acquisitions craze of the decade past.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this story is what is
absent from it. Far removed from their conventional role as the
FCC's regulatory nemesis, the broadcast networks have contrib-
uted little or nothing to this struggle. The old play-
ers-networks, local broadcasters, and broadcasting conglomer-
ates-have suddenly found themselves in the same position that
many silent movie stars occupied after the invention of the
"talkies." How strange a denouement to this story of imperfect
competition and its regulation.56'
Mass communications law's last picture show has depicted
the close of a regulatory era-and perhaps the dawn of a new
one. When cable's Golden Age had just begun to tarnish, the
FCC opened the door to direct transmissions from communica-
tions satellites to viewers' homes.562 The scarcity rationale
that has dominated mass communications law is yielding to the
559. See Mark Landler, AT&T Enters TV Business Via Satellite Broadcast-
ing, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1996, at D1.
560. Edmund L. Andrews, News Corp. and MCI Win Satellite Slot, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1996, at Cl; see also Edmund L. Andrews, A Cable Giant Drops
Out of Satellite Auction, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1996, at C1 (reporting that cable
giant Tele-Communications Inc. was abandoning its efforts to acquire the slot
eventually awarded to News Corp. and MCI).
561. Cf Posner, supra note 70, at 611-16 (criticizing the "natural monopoly"
rationale that often obscures regulators' actual but unarticulated fear of
excessive competition).
562. See ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 725 F.2d 732, 756 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (holding that the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 gave the FCC
"broad discretion" to permit a wholesaler of satellite services to sell its services
directly to the public); Elletta S. Callahan, Note, Cable Television vs. Direct
Broadcast Satellites: Market Competition Replaces the FCC as the Guarantor of
the Public Interest, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 851, 868-86 (1983) (analyzing the
FCC's passive regulation of direct broadcast satellites); Gary A. Lehman, Note,
New Wave Policy: Protection of Direct Broadcasting Satellite Transmission
Under Section 605, 14 Sw. U. L. REV. 590, 601-11 (1984) (examining the
applicability of former law developed under 47 U.S.C. § 605 to the then-
emerging direct broadcast satellites).
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problems of competitive excess. Instead of rationing allotments
of scarce broadcasting frequencies, mass media regulators have
already begun worrying about cream-skimming, excessive
competition, and cross-subsidies. Price-sensitive subscription
services have seized ever larger market shares in an industry
formerly characterized by "free" broadcasts and nonprice
competition. Three years ago, Bell operating companies
celebrated a small victory in their quest to enter the information
services market.56 3 They now stand triumphant, having won
a far greater battle to enter the long-distance and video pro-
gramming markets.
The ultimate winner of the communications wars, at least
for a very brief moment in this most volatile industry, may be
neither broadcast television nor its frequent antagonist,
cablecasting. In a perverse twist of fate, the gold-plated
telephone network built during the Bell system's long tenure
may give the Bell operating companies an insurmountable lead
in the race to conquer tomorrow's mass media markets. The
desire for private, person-to-person communications may already
have had the incidental effect of financing the most sophisticated
mass media facility ever imagined: interactive, "on-demand"
information services and audiovisual programming delivered
over phone lines.
Just as Marconi underestimated the communicative
potential of his wireless telegraph, Alexander Graham Bell may
have undersold the telephone. But one factor remains unsettled:
Will the law continue to obstruct technological evolution and
economic progress? Congress, the FCC, and the federal courts
have always had the power either to permit or to block the
completion of a circle that began with Bell's historic request for
help, "Mr. Watson, come here, I want you."5" The clarion call
of competition has never sounded louder. The implementation
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 will soon tell us whether
Bell truly succeeded in his grander project of educating the deaf.
563. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir.)
(finding reasonable the Department of Justice's conclusion that public interest
required removal of restrictions on Bell operating companies engaging in
information service businesses), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 487 (1993).
564. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 14, § 1.2.1.
1510
